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"If a physician make a large incision with the operating knife and cure it. .. he shall receive ten 
shekels in money. 
"If a physician make a large incision with the operating knife, and kill him ... his hands shall be 
cut off." 
-Code ofHammurabi, 1870 BC 
ABSTRACT 
Tasked by the government through the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of2005 to 
transform Medicare from a passive payer into an active purchaser of care, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been investigating methods of incorporating pay-
for-performance (P4P) models into Medicare. When CMS published its Value-Based Purchasing 
(VBP) proposal for overhaul of Medicare inpatient reimbursements in November of2007, the 
proponents and skeptics alike had much to say about the new plan. Some approved strongly. 
Some disapproved vehemently, while most others were somewhere in between. 
Certain themes surrounding VBP continue to surface. What do stakeholders believe are 
the key issues surrounding P4P and the VBP proposal? How and why do payers and providers 
differ in their support for VBP? Do all stakeholders find common ground in the VBP, or are 
some aspects ofVBP particularly agreeable or distasteful? Has CMS structured the VBP 
proposal in ways that will maximize VBP's chances of success? Does VBP pose a threat to 
small and rural hospitals already struggling to stay afloat? Does the literature support CMS's 
claim that VBP can improve quality of health care while reducing costs? 
In order to address these questions, I performed a systematic review of the literature, 
reviewed media accounts, interviewed key stakeholders, and studied the stakeholder responses 
provided to the Senate Finance Committee Roundtable on Hospital Value-Based Purchasing. I 
found that payer groups were eager to introduce VBP, while the hospital and professional groups 
were concerned that VBP threatened their own interests, especially regarding budget neutrality. 
However, I also found some important items of consensus as well that could lay the groundwork 
for the future ofVBP. 
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BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
For years, policymakers have searched for ways to control spiraling costs to the public 
health care sector while improving the level of quality provided. The reason for the focus on 
inpatient services is clear: the average hospital inpatient admission costs between $2000 aod 
$3000 a day. 1 The reimbursement structure inadvertently allowed for reimbursement of 
duplicate tests aod services as well as for care resulting from poor performance such as 
readmissions after avoidable adverse outcomes? Medicare began as a fee-for-service (FFS) 
program, reimbursing providers based on each service performed aod therefore obviating aoy 
incentive to curtail medical expenditures for procedures such as cardiac catheterizations aod 
diagnostic tools such as CT scans aod MRis. 
While expenditures have been increasing, quality of care still lags behind that of other 
countries. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published To Err is Human: Building a 
Safer Health System, arguing that the US health care system did not take enough measures to 
insure patient safety aod recommending urgent measures to address this problem.3 The I OM's 
2001 report, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 2F' Century, boldly 
argued that the US health care system did not meet established benchmarks for quality.4 These 
reports, along with embarrassing aoecdotal stories of poor quality aod multiple studies and 
essays describing the problems with health care in the US, have led to nationwide efforts to 
improve quality. However, while the scope of information about, and research pertaining to, 
health care quality in the US has increased dramatically, serious questions concerning the quality 
of health care in the United States remain. 
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The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 and Reporting Hospital Quality Data for 
Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU) 
In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Modernization Act, which President George W. 
Bush claimed would "allow the biggest improvements in senior health care in nearly 40 years." 
Most of the public and media attention was on the massive $400 billion prescription drug benefit 
that accompanied the bill. However, Section 50l(b) of the MMA also called for a new hospital 
performance-reporting program called the Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment 
Update (RHQDAPU), a pay-for-reporting (P4R) program that would provide incentive for 
hospitals reimbursed by the acute Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) to report 
performance data on all hospital patients (not just Medicare patients). The goal ofRHQDAPU 
was to increase transparency of health care performance and glve health care consumers certain 
tools to make informed decisions about their health care choices. Beginning in 2004, hospitals 
would provide data on 10 different quality indicators of care for acute MI, heart failure, and 
pneumonia. 
In 2005, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) launched the Hospital 
Compare website to allow anyone to view a comparison of these quality indicators across all 
participating hospitals.5 Although participation in RHQDAPU is technically voluntary, a 
revision to IPPS would allow CMS to reduce IPPS payments by 0.4% to hospitals that did not 
participate. This ensured that the vast majority of hospitals would submit performance data for 
public analysis and hospital comparisons. In 2005, almost every hospital (98.3%) did in fact 
release these quality data, and 96% met the required criteria and received full reimbursement.6 
This initiative ran the risk of providing too little data for the typical consumer to use and 
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punishing hospitals for several arbitrary benchmarks. Certain indicators, especially the antibiotic 
requirement within 4 hours of arrival for pneumonia, also led to gaming (to be discussed later). 
Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of2005 
Through the Deficit Reduction Act of2005, Section 5001(b), P.L. 109-171, Congress 
authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to develop a plan to implement Value-
Based Purchasing (VBP), a policy mechanism that would link payment to performance, helping 
changing Medicare from a passive payer into an active purchaser. 6 Congress asked CMS 
propose a plan by 2007 to implement VBP by 2009 and include 1) the continuous development 
of quality measures for the inpatient setting, 2) collection and validation of this data, 3) the 
structure for appropriate reimbursement (VBP adjustments), and 4) public reporting 
(transparency). Congress also directed the secretary ofDHHS to adopt performance measures 
introduced by the 2005 report from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) entitled Performance 
Measurement: Accelerating lmprovement.7 This report, following in the footsteps of To Err is 
Human and Crossing the Quality Chasm, argued that despite significant interest and widespread 
investments, as well as per capita health care spending far exceeding that of other countries, 
progress in improving health care quality remains slow, and significant disparities within our 
countries remain. The report criticizes our health care system for lacking a coherent, efficient 
system for assessing and reporting performance data as well as strong central leadership, without 
which individual stakeholders cannot act together to effect health care system reform. In order to 
create a comprehensive and standardized system of reporting performance data, IOM encourages 
the use of 22 Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA) measures as well as the Hospital Consumer 
Assessment of Health care Providers (HCAHPS) patient survey (described later). In response, 
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CMS began to investigate methods for creating a VBP payment program for inpatient 
reimbursement based on P4P. 
The DRA also increased CMS's ability to ensure participation in RHQDAPU. Again, 
while participation in RHQDAPU was technically voluntary, a revision to the IPPS would allow 
CMS to reduce IPPS payments by an even greater margin (2%) for hospitals that did not 
participate. Meanwhile, CMS expanded RHQDAPU from 10 to 21 quality indicators regarding 
care for acute MI, heart failure, and pneumonia, as well as the Surgical Care Improvement 
Project (SCIP), which involves the use of prophylactic antibiotics for surgery. 
The 2007 update to RHQDAPU, and the HCAHPS survey 
CMS provided a 3.3% increase in Medicare funding for all hospitals that complied with 
RHQDAPU. 8 For those that did not comply, the reimbursement increase for 2008 was only 
1.3%. CMS also revised the hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) to add 
several additional measures to RHQDAPU, bringing the total number of quality indicators 
measured by RHQDAPU to 27. Measures include mortality measures, additions to SCIP, and 
results from the HCAHPS patient survey (as encouraged by the IOM Performance Measurement 
report). This survey, consisting of27 items, introduced the concept of patient satisfaction as a 
benchmark, giving the patients the opportunity to influence Medicare reimbursement. HCAHPS 
includes satisfaction with communication with health care providers, responsiveness of staff, 
cleanliness, pain control, and discharge information9 
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The Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) Project 
In 2003, CMS initiated the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), a 
three-year pilot program designed to test the ability ofP4P to improve the quality and decrease 
the cost of inpatient hospital care. To date, HQID is the largest pilot demonstration ofP4P in the 
US. The demonstration was designed to "define quality measures and reward top-performing 
hospitals" and enrolled over 260 hospitals on a voluntary basis. 10 The demonstration tracked 
performance data on 34 quality measures in five different clinical categories and developed by 
numerous public and private organizations: acute myocardial infarction (MI), heart failure, 
community-acquired pneumonia, coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), and hip/knee surgery. 
Among the measures are shorter length of stays and fewer readmissions. 11 CMS would then 
compare hospital performance data with the best recommended practices for all 5 categories and 
reward or punish hospitals according to a carrot-or-stick model. For example, hospitals in the 
top 10% of each category would receive an additional 2% reimbursement per case, while 
hospitals in the next 10% would receive an additional 1% reimbursement per case. However, 
hospitals failing to improve from the bottom 20% by the third year face a 2% reduction in 
payment. For certain hospitals with slim margins, a gain or loss of 2% in payment can be 
significant. 
CMS's proposed plan to implement inpatient P4P for Medicare: Value-Based Purchasing 
In November of2007, CMS placed before Congress a 104 page report outlining 
guidelines for the adoption of its proposed VBP initiatives, built around the concept ofP4P and 
covering all inpatient services reimbursed by Medicare.6 The report proposes replacing 
RHQDAPU with a new program that combines public reporting and an incentive-driven payment 
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system that focuses on quality of health care, patient-centeredness, and efficiency, as encouraged 
by the IOM in its 2006 report, Rewarding Provider Performance: Aligning Incentives in 
Medicare. 12 To address clinical quality as well as efficiency, and having learned from the 
mistakes of Premier HQID, CMS promised to expand outcome measures, while noting that risk 
adjustment would be more complicated that process measures and that CMS must be vigilant in 
finding negative unintended consequences of incentivizing outcomes. To address patient-
centered care, CMS would incorporate the HCAHPS patient survey. Importantly, CMS 
proposed that Congress implement VBP in a budget -neutral fashion. 
The new VBP plan would include several important components. CMS would develop a 
Performance Assessment Model to assess hospital performance across various quality indicators, 
which would then be compiled into a Total Performance Score. This Total Performance Score 
would then be translated into an incentive payment. Since few would expect such sweeping 
reform to be perfect in initial attempts, the measure development process should be well-
structured and spelled out clearly. CMS must have a plan to validate the data and study the 
impact of the transition so that any problems can be quickly addressed. The transition itself 
should be phased over several years. And most importantly, all the results should be publicly 
available. 
The Performance Assessment Model and Measure Development/Selection 
The performance assessment model would be the yearly overall indicator from which 
incentives are determined. The performance assessment model would combine several domains 
such as clinical processes, clinical outcomes, and patient satisfaction. Policymakers could 
choose to weigh each domain equally, or instead choose to give greater weight to some domains, 
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depending on what they wanted to emphasize. CMS would set the attainment threshold, at 
which point hospitals would earn attainment points (and incentive payments), at roughly 50th 
percentile, with the benchmark for exemplary performance (and full incentive payments) set at 
roughly 90th percentile. CMS believed that the amount of payment incentive should not be 
determined by a linear exchange rate: for example, if policymakers wanted to emphasize 
improvement at the lower end of performance, the slope of the exchange rate would be higher at 
that point, thus giving greater incentive to lower-performing hospitals to improve performance. 
In order to prevent punishment of hospitals performing at a lower baseline level and provide 
incentive for all hospitals to improve, the proposed model would use the higher score between an 
"attainment score" (the traditional performance score) and an "improvement score" (which 
compares the hospital with its prior baseline performance). 
Importantly, not all measures would have to be used to determine incentive. While all 
VBP measures would be reported publicly, only a subset would determine incentive payments. 
CMS could use the other measures for measure development and selection. In this fashion, CMS 
could assess the suitability of various measures without having potentially adverse effects in 
terms of incentive payments. The process of developing and selecting measures would occur in 
three stages. In the first stage, a proposed measure would undergo a "preliminary data 
submission period" in order to collect data. In the second stage, CMS would release the data 
publicly and investigate whether the measure met a list of criteria (such as feasibility, 
importance, and scientific acceptability). In the third stage, CMS would add the measure to the 
VBP criteria for incentive payments. Using the same process, CMS could retire certain measures 
deemed inappropriate. 
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Phased transition from RHQDAPU to VBP 
CMS prefers a phased transition from RHQDAPU to VBP in order to give hospitals time 
to adjust to measures and benchmarks, as well as to gather enough performance data to 
determine how to set incentive payments. CMS would require three years to make the transition, 
incorporating a "baseline" period and a "measurement" period. CMS, responding to hospital 
feedback, noted that the benchmarks and thresholds should be based on prior experience rather 
than current experience (as per Premier HQID), mainly so that the hospitals would know the 
performance standards in advance. The baseline period, starting on April 1 and ending March 30 
would precede the measurement period by 12 months, allowing CMS to set baseline performance 
scores for all the hospitals as reference points. The measurement period would then precede the 
VBP year (from October 1 to August 30) by several months, allowing all hospitals to submit data 
(and resubmit if necessary), as well as giving CMS the time to obtain and validate the 
measurements and then determine incentive payments. CMS could introduce new measures 
experimentally in this fashion, allowing hospitals to collect data without public reporting. While 
RHQDAPU allowed 135 days for hospitals to submit data after each quarter, which made it 
difficult for CMS to adjust certain measures and provide feedback, VBP would narrow the 
submission period to 60 days and possibly require reporting for every month. 
Funding of incentive payments in a budget-neutral fashion 
A key component ofVBP would be budget neutrality. Like Premier's HQID program, 
CMS would require no additional funding for this model. Instead, CMS proposed that the 
incentive come from a pool created by a percentage of the existing DRG payment and linked to 
performance based on clinical services provided during an inpatient stay. In other words, if 
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hospitals performed well", they would receive their percentage back, plus an additional amount. 
On the other hand, if hospitals performed poorly, they might not receive their percentage. CMS 
noted that the size of incentive would be important in dictating hospital behavior, though no 
definitive research has been conducted to determine the optimal size. CMS proposed a 2-5% of 
DRG payments be used as incentive payments. CMS also proposed that the incentive payments 
apply to all discharges, not only the discharges with specific incentive measures, so that hospitals 
would work to improve their quality of care across the board and not just for a subset of patients. 
One important example of this would be the HCAHPS patient satisfaction survey. Given that not 
all hospitals would earn the full incentive payment, CMS proposed that the unused funds be 
placed in a pool to be dispersed later as additional incentive. Not surprisingly, hospitals have 
voiced displeasure with budget neutrality, given that gains made by some hospitals would be at 
the expense of others (to be expanded later). 
Supporting research and hospital feedback 
To create and provide an evidence base for the VBP model, CMS created a Hospital VBP 
Workgroup that investigated measures, data infrastructure and validation, incentive structure, 
and public reporting.6 To assist in this research, this workgroup contracted with RAND, an 
independent nonprofit global policy think tank, as well as a team from Brandeis University. The 
Workgroup reviewed P4P literature and surveyed existing P4P programs. Upon finding that P4P 
literature was scarce and limited, the Workgroup had RAND interview a range of organizations 
including P4P sponsors, organizations involved with public reporting, hospitals participating in 
RHQDAPU and Premier HQID (the large Medicare inpatient P4P demonstration), and hospital 
associations. 
9 
According to RAND, all hospitals reported that RHQDAPU and Premier HQID were 
helpful in preparation for VBP, which most believe to be inevitable. Most hospitals wanted the 
measures used to be evidence-based and with the support of quality organizations such as the 
National Quality Forum (NQF) and the Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA), and hospitals tended to 
be reticent about allowing patient satisfaction data to help form their bottom line. RAND also 
noted that RHQDAPU caused hospitals to anticipate the coming emphasis on quality of health 
care. However, hospitals tended to complain about the cost of implementation of health IT 
required for these programs, and they questioned whether the incentives provided could even 
cover the costs, much less earn them bonuses. Hospitals especially dislike relative thresholds for 
performance measures and almost universally prefer absolute thresholds, such that every hospital 
reaching and exceeding this benchmark would gamer a reward without any hospital necessarily 
having to "lose." Small and rural hospitals have voiced concern that smaller volume of patients 
and the cost of health IT would make participation more difficult, and that VBP should include 
measures that focused specifically on these hospitals, such as transfers and coordination of care. 
My hypotheses are that payer groups and provider groups have significant differences in 
their approach to the VBP proposal, especially concerning issues such as budget neutrality and 
the process of measure selection and development. Nevertheless, I believe that all parties believe 
VBP is inevitable and that Congress will ultimately pass the VBP proposal sooner rather than 
later. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Search Strategy 
It is important to understand the evidence base that does- or does not- underlie CMS' 
assumptions about what P4P and VBP can accomplish. I assessed the evidence by performing a 
PubMed search with the key terms (pay for performance) and quality, with limits set to full text 
and free full text. The search returned 68 results, of which all 68 had abstracts. I then reviewed 
abstracts for appropriateness of inclusion; for example, I excluded studies performed outside the 
United States, and I also excluded opinion, editorial, and "perspective" pieces, or other content 
not related to the present study question. I included actual trials of quality improvement 
interventions, and I included abstracts that were sufficiently unclear that I needed to review the 
full article. This process produced a list of six articles including actual trials of improvement in 
the United States relevant to this paper's research question. I also searched the CMS VBP 
Proposal to Congress for relevant papers and selected the Premier White Paper, given that it is a 
preferred citation ofP4P proponents, and Grossbart et al., given that it used contemporary 
controls for comparison. The final systematic literature review includes 9 studies, and they are 
summarized in Appendix 2. 
Premier HQID studies 
Of this review's eight studies, four directly involve the CMS Premier HQID program. 
The studies involving Premier HQID are of most interest to me because the structure of Premier 
HQID is similar to that of the VBP proposal. Given the importance of Premier HQID and its 
implications on the design of VBP, it is surprising that investigators have conducted so few 
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studies on the effectiveness of Premier HQID. In addition, the data overall suggests weak 
improvement in quality among participating hospitals, and even then, the studies themselves 
have flaws that bring the question the internal and external validity of these results. 
The Premier White Papers are reports summarizing Premier HQID's year I and year 2 
performance data for all 262 participating hospitals. 13• 14 Instead of using contemporary controls, 
Premier elected to use a before-and-after design, comparing the quality performance data at the 
beginning of year I to the same measures at the end of year I for the entire universe of initial 
participants. For the second report, Premier merely compared the mean scores for year I with 
the mean scores for year 2. Participants were all invited and chose to accept the invitation; CME 
did not elect to collect data on similar measures in nonparticipating medical centers, most likely 
because such data are not always collected with incentives or requirements to do so. Premier 
collected data on performance measures for five different conditions (AMI, HF, CAP, CABG, 
and hip/knee replacement), including both process measures and inpatient mortality data. 
Measurement of the performance measures appears to be equal, valid, and reliable, decreasing 
the possibility of measurement bias. 
The Premier White Paper found that from the beginning of year I to the end of year I, 
participating hospitals on average improved in all categories, from 3.4% in AMI to 9.8% in CAP. 
All differences were significant. Between year I and year 2, the mean performance improved in 
all categories, from 3.5% in AMI to 9.8% in CAP. As with year I, all differences were 
significant. 
The internal validity for the Premier White Paper is poor to fair. All participating 
systems used the same measures, with well-established and agreed-upon underlying meanings. 
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However, the Premier systems were not compared to nonparticipating systems. Without 
contemporary controls, we cannot know whether the improvements in the Premier 
demonstrations were the result of factors other than incentive payment. For example, the 
improvement could be due to the public nature of the program (transparency) or some technical 
aspect of the program (health IT and consultation support, for example). Nonetheless, the fact 
that more than 200 participating systems showed improvement over the period is suggestive. 
The external validity for the Premier White paper is unknown. The hospitals 
participating in Premier HQID were invited and accepted the offer, demonstrating particular 
motivation to participate in a P4P that is likely not shared by all hospitals across the nation. 
These hospitals were also likely better prepared from a structural standpoint than the average 
hospital. Therefore, it is difficult to support the use of these data when trying to justifY the 
creation ofVBP that is based on similar principles and design. 
Lindenauer eta!. conducted a non-randomized controlled trial studying the ability of 
participation in the Premier HQID program to improve quality of care for AMI, HF, and CAP .15 
Lindenauer eta!. gathered data on 207 hospitals participating in the Premier HQID and 
compared them to a control group of 406 hospitals under public reporting only (through the 
Hospital Compare website) over 2 years. Hospitals wishing to participate in Premier HQID 
needed a minimum of 30 cases per condition annually to be eligible. Of the 266 hospitals 
participating in Premier HQID, 11 dropped out during the first 2 years, leaving 255 hospitals 
eligible for primary analysis. For controls, Lindenauer et a!. screened for eligible participants 
among the HQA voluntary reporting program. Controls were eligible if they submitted at least 
30 cases for each condition annually and did had not either declined participation in HQID or 
13 
participated in HQID and dropped out later. Thus, crossover was not an issue. Lindenauer et a!. 
attempted to match each HQID participant with one or two HQA hospitals based on number of 
beds, teaching status, region, location (urban versus rural), and ownership status (profit or non-
profit). 
Based on Table 2, the intervention and control groups appear comparable, with very little 
variation in characteristics such as number of beds, location, teaching status, region, and 
ownership. However, the participants were not selected at random, instead being matched by the 
aforementioned characteristics. There was also no mention of allocation concealment, so I 
assume the investigators were aware of the allocation process. Given that the selection process 
was not randomized, there is potential for selection bias, but the groups are comparable per Table 
2, suggesting that selection bias is less of a factor. 
Primary outcomes were the differences between 10 HQID measures in the 4th quarter of 
2003 and the 3'd quarter of 2005. The measures included 5 AMI measures, 2 HF measures, and 3 
CAP measures, as well as appropriate care measures for all three conditions and composite 
process scores for all three conditions plus an overall composite process score for all 10 
conditions. Assessments of these measures appear to be equal, valid, and reliable, with little 
possibility of measurement bias. 
While randomization is difficult to impossible in a study such as this, the lack of 
randomization nevertheless raises the possibility of confounding. The investigators did not 
describe the process of selecting the group of 207 hospitals in the intervention group, except to 
say that they were chosen because they matched closely with control hospitals by demographics. 
The investigators did mention that they excluded controls that had either turned down HQID 
participation or began participating and later dropped out, thus controlling for any confounding 
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based on the possibility that these hospitals felt like HQID was not a workable plan or a good 
idea. However, the hospitals that have agreed to participate in Premier HQID are likely not 
identical to the control groups. Given that they were invited and voluntarily decided to 
participate, these hospitals are more likely to have the infrastructure sufficiently developed to 
support P4P, as well as staff and employees more likely to embrace P4P. The authors attempted 
to account for this participation effect by adding hospitals that declined participation in HQID. 
However, these hospitals are likely also not comparable to the control, based on the same reasons 
provided by the authors above, as well as the fact that these hospitals were not incentivized and 
therefore would not have experienced the same effects ofP4P. 
Lindenauer eta!. found that both P4P hospitals and control hospitals showed 
improvement over the 2 year study period, but also that P4P hospitals showed greater 
improvement on 7 of 10 individual measures, ranging from .6% (p=.009) to 10.9 (p<.OO!). In 
addition, P4P hospitals showed improvement on composite measures, from 4.1% (p<.OO!) to 
5.2% (p<.001). Also, stratified analysis demonstrated an inverse relationship between baseline 
performance and overall improvement in both groups. After adjusting for effects ofbaseline 
performance, the overall improvement decreased to 2.6% for AMI (p<.001) and 4.1% for HF 
(p<.001). 
Overall, internal validity of this study is fair but not good, mainly because it is difficult to 
believe that the hospitals in the intervention group are identical to the hospitals in the control. 
One way to control for the so-called "volunteer effect"- that is, the constellation of variables 
that make one hospital willing to try a challenging new program, while another similar hospital 
will not- may have been random assigmnent of groups, but this would have been impossible in 
this type of study. I am not convinced that analysis including the hospitals that declined to 
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participate would be enough to account for this effect. Another issue is that the investigators did 
not control for technical aspects of Premier (health IT and consultation). The results themselves 
are statistically significant as demonstrated by the p-values. Lindenauer et al. 's study is to date 
the largest Premier HQID study with a contemporary control (including a large majority of 
Premier HQID programs), which does help internal validity. 
External validity is also fair. The hospitals agreeing to participate in both the Premier 
HQID and the HQA voluntary reporting program may be a select population of hospitals 
motivated to be the pioneers of quality control. Indeed, their difference from controls should be 
taken as a reason for further exploration of what makes institutions willing to innovate. These 
results may be hard to extend to the general population of hospitals that may be less well-
prepared to handle either voluntary reporting or P4P, unless we can identify the "willingness to 
innovate" variables and then find ways to spread them to other institutions. Also, the 
improvements, while statistically significant, are small and may not justify the large amount of 
financial investment into the program. Importantly of note is that this study received funding 
from CMS. I am unsure what, if any, role CMS had to play in the study other than financial 
assistance. 
Grossbart et a!. conducted a non-randomized controlled trial studying the ability of 
participation in Premier HQID to improve quality of care for AMI, HF, and CAP .16 Gross bart et 
a!. compared 4 acute care hospitals in Catholic Healthcare Partners participating in Premier 
HQID with 6 acute care hospitals in the same organization that declined to participate in Premier 
HQID. To ensure comparability, Grossbart eta!. chose hospitals in this group that had similar 
levels of service. All I 0 hospitals have an open-heart program and are referral centers. In 
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addition, Grossbart et al. tried to choose hospitals with similar average annual discharges, case 
mix index, and staffed beds. Grossbart et al. did not choose the hospitals randomly. 
Per Table 1, the intervention and control group appear somewhat comparable, but the 
small number of hospitals in each group mean a very wide standard deviation in each category 
(staffed beds, annual inpatient admissions, and case mix index). The averages of each 
characteristic seem somewhat similar. Also, given that all1 0 hospitals are from the same group, 
it is possible that the demographics of the hospitals are similar, but Gross bart et al. provided little 
data to support this theory. Given that each of the four hospitals in the intervention group come 
from different regional health systems, the demographics for these hospitals likely vary. 
Gross bart et al. did not specify how they selected the hospitals for the control group other than to 
say that they were chosen for similar characteristics as the intervention group. 
Since the selection process was not randomized, there is fair to strong potential for 
selection bias. The groups do not seem entirely comparable per Table 1, and the Grossbart et al. 
did not provide many details on demographics and patient admissions or patient comparability. 
Compounding the problem is that the group sizes are very small ( 4 and 6 hospitals). Thus, the 
potential for selection bias is very strong. Primary outcomes included composite quality scores 
on AMI, CAP, and HF, as well as an overall composite quality score. The authors then 
calculated improvement between Oct I, 2002 and Sept 30, 2003. These measurements appear to 
be equal, valid, and reliable, diminishing the possibility of measurement bias. 
The potential for confounding is high, given the lack of randomization, though like the 
other studies, randomization would be difficult to impossible to achieve. In particular, the 
selection process raises the potential for confounding. Grossbart et al. report that the four 
hospitals in the intervention group volunteered, while the others that were included in the control 
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group declined to participate. Even more so than Lindenauer eta!., this raises the strong 
possibility that the priorities of these hospitals for quality improvement are different, given that 
they all come from the same hospital group. The hospital administrators likely consulted each 
other before making their decisions, suggesting that participation (or declining to participate) in 
each of these groups was not an independent event. This suggests a systematic difference in the 
level of preparation for, and commitment to, quality improvement, both in the infrastructure and 
the hospital staff. 
Grossbart et a!. found significant differences in improvement from baseline to one year 
after intervention between the P4P hospitals and the control hospitals. For HF, the P4P hospitals 
improved 19.2% compared with 10.9% for control hospitals (p<.001). However, for AMI and 
CAP, P4P hospitals improved by 2.9% versus 3.1% and 7.9% versus 7.2% (p not given, but 
reported as not significant). Overall, due to the strength of the improvement for HF, P4P 
hospitals improved by 9.3% versus 6.7% (p<.001). 
Given the small sample size and strong possibilities of selection bias and confounding, 
the internal validity of this study is poor. Grossbart et a!. made little attempt to control for 
confounding, and beyond several superficial demographics, also made little attempt to prove that 
the hospitals in each group were comparable to one another. Since the study only included 4 
hospitals in the intervention group and 6 in the control group, the power of this study is very low 
as well. In addition, as in the previous studies mentioned, Grossbart et a!. did not control for the 
contribution of technical aspects of Premier HQID to the improvement. Given that this study 
involved only hospitals from a specific hospital group with specific goals of quality 
improvement, external validity of this study is also poor. 
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Glickman et al. conducted a non-randomized controlled trial investigating the effects of 
participation in Premier HQID on quality of care regarding AMI only. 17 Glickman et al. 
compared patients from hospitals participating in CRUSADE (a voluntary observational quality-
improvement initiative) and Premier HQID to patients from hospitals participating in CRUSADE 
only. Overall, 54 hospitals were in the intervention group, compared with 446 hospitals as the 
control. Glickman et al. included patients if they presented at a CRUSADE hospital within 24 
hours of ischemic symptoms plus positive cardiac biomarkers or ischemic ST-segment ECG 
changes. 
Per Table 1, the two groups are comparable in the types of patients presenting as well as 
patient history and presenting signs and symptoms, but the facilities are not as comparable. The 
P4P hospitals are larger, more academically oriented, and located primarily in the south. The 
study design was obviously not randomized, given that the investigators used all the Premier 
HQID participants also participating in CRUSADE as their intervention group, and using all 
other hospitals in CRUSADE as the control. Given that the selection process was not 
randomized, there is potential for selection bias, but Glickman et al. made no attempt to control 
for these variables. 
Glickman et al. used a combination of 6 CMS process measures and 8 non-CMS process 
measures, as well as in-hospital mortality. These measures appear to be equal, valid, and 
reliable, thus minimizing the possibility of measurement bias. Like the other papers, lack of 
randomization introduces the possibility of confounding. Given that the demographics of the 
hospitals are not very similar, the hospital groups are not too comparable. Surprisingly, the 
patient variables were similar. Nevertheless, the potential for confounding is fairly high and not 
explored in detail. 
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Glickman et a!. found that differences in process measures as well as patient in-hospital 
mortality were not statistically significant, with the only exceptions being aspirin at discharge, 
smoking cessation counseling, and lipid-lowering agent at discharge (3 of 15 measures). Like 
Lindenauer, stratified analyses found that hospitals with lower baseline rates improved faster, but 
there was no statistically significant difference in improvement between P4P hospitals and 
control hospitals. 
Glickman et a!.' s study has fair internal validity due to the lack of comparability between 
hospitals in the intervention versus control group, introducing the possibility of both selection 
bias and confounding for which Glickman eta!. did not attempt to control. Glickman eta!. 's 
study, like Lindenauer et a!.' s study, suffers from the "volunteer effect," given that the hospitals 
in the intervention group voluntarily enrolled in Premier HQID, suggesting a difference in 
priorities and infrastructure regarding quality improvement. Unlike Lindenauer et a!., however, 
Glickman et a!. does not make any attempt to control for the volunteer effect. Glickman eta!., 
just like the other studies, did not control for the contribution of technical aspects of the program 
to quality improvement. Glickman eta!. 's study has fair external validity as well. This study, 
like those conducted by Grossbart et a!. and Lindenauer et a!., used hospitals that voluntarily 
enrolled in Premier HQID, limiting the study's applicability to hospitals across the nation. 
These four papers demonstrate how mixed the data supporting Premier HQID really is. 
While the Premier White Papers purport statistically significant improvements for all five 
conditions through year I and year 2, the lack of contemporary control makes concluding that 
P4P led to quality improvement to be very difficult. Grossbart et a!. found statistically 
significant differences for all three conditions studied, but a small size along with problems 
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involved with the selection process and little attempt to control for confounding variables leads 
to poor internal validity. On the other hand, Glickman et al. found no statistically significant 
differences in performance between the hospitals in Premier HQID and CRUSADE and hospitals 
in CRUSADE only. Glickman et al. 's study, however, suffers from similar issues of selection 
bias and confounding, though a much larger sample size adds some power and increases internal 
validity. Lindenauer et al. found statistically significant differences in quality performance. Of 
the three papers, Lindenauer et al. appears to have the strongest internal and external validity. 
However, while Lindenauer et al. does the best job of controlling for confounders, the study 
cannot account for all possibilities of confounding. All four papers rely on voluntary 
participation of hospitals in Premier HQID, and the selection process is not random, decreasing 
internal and external validity. Finally, none of the papers controls for possible contributions of 
the technical aspects supplied in Premier HQID. Premier HQID provided health IT for data 
collection as well as considerable technical support for participating hospitals, which could very 
well have made a statistically significant different in performance. Clearly investigators must 
continue to research the ability of Premier HQID to improve performance while also doing a 
better job controlling for confounding. 
All the papers about Premier HQID, except for the Premier White Papers, investigate the 
difference between quality improvement produced by P4P and public reporting as compared to 
public reporting only. Many experts believe that public reporting provides strong non-financial 
incentive to improve quality. 18 However, none of these papers attempts to provide control 
hospitals that are neither involved in Premier HQID nor publicly reporting. This would have 
allowed investigators to determine just how much of a contribution public reporting was making 
to quality improvement as opposed to some other confounding variable. In addition, the public 
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reporting for the P4P groups is not identical the public reporting for the control; the intervention 
groups report to two different programs instead of just one. 
Not surprisingly, Lindenauer eta!. and Glickman et al. observed an inverse relationship 
between baseline performance and overall improvement throughout the study. This is an 
interesting finding, given that Premier HQID only rewards attainment and not improvement (as 
the VBP proposal would). It is possible that the VBP's joint attainment/improvement scoring 
system may lead to even faster improvement among hospitals with lower baseline performance, 
but this is only conjecture. 
Other P4P papers 
I also examined other studies more generally related to P4P. In these studies, P4P's 
effectiveness is similarly mixed, and the programs may not have been of the same (or even 
similar) design to VBP, indicating that their results might not be as applicable to future VBP 
considerations. Nevertheless, I was still interested in reading papers that studied the ability of 
P4P to improve quality of health care in principle. 
Cutler eta!. performed a retrospective cohort study on the ability ofP4P in a California-
based medical group, Mercy Medical Group, to improve the quality of cholesterol management 
on an outpatient basis. 19 Cutler et a!. identified 165 patients with diabetes mellitus type 2 and 
elevated LDL-C cared for under a P4P program (CDCM) and compared them to a control group 
of 1694 patients in the same plan with the same conditions, but under routine care. Based on 
Table 4, the two groups appear roughly comparable, though the study only listed gender and age 
for comparison, so selection bias is still an issue. Confounding is a possibility since no eligibility 
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criteria were given for patients under CDCM program. Cutler et al. measured rates ofLDL-C 
testing and goal attainment ofLDL-C (<130mg/dL) between the two groups. These measures 
appear equal, valid, and reliable, so measurement bias is unlikely. The study showed that 
participants in CDCM were at >75th percentile for LDL-C testing rate and >90'h percentile for 
goal attainment ofLDL-C, compared with <20th percentile and 75th percentile for routine care. 
Both differences were statistically significant (p<.OOl ). 
Internal validity for this study is fair to good. This author would have liked more 
demographic information for comparability as well as criteria for participating in CDCM, as this 
could lead to possible confounding. External validity is limited since this study involved simple 
outpatient measures, and VBP is a large inpatient P4P program. 
Mandel et al. studied the effect ofP4P on 44 practices in Cincinnati as part of an asthma 
improvement collaborative.20 Mandel et al. did not use a contemporary control for this study. 
Mandel et al. measured flu shot percentage, controller medication percentage for children with 
persistent asthma, and written self-management plan percentage and compared performance over 
the network from the beginning to the end of the 3 year study period. Mandel et al. monitored 
the distribution of rewards earned by 4 3 practices based on their performance on the 
aforementioned measures. The study found that the percentage of asthma patients receiving 
"perfect" care rose from 4% to 88%, while the percentage of asthma patients receiving the flu 
vaccine rose from 22% to 62%. 
Internal validity of this study is fair. On one hand, this paper lacks a contemporary 
control group. However, the need for a control group in this type of study is probably 
diminished by the fact that any contemporary control groups would likely not improve at the 
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same rate, if at all, given a lack of obvious incentive (such as a public reporting system for 
performance results, as is the case in other studies such as Lindenauer eta!.). As with the Cutler 
eta!. study, external validity is limited for VBP since this study involved outpatient measures 
rather than inpatient measures. In addition, this study only emphasized positive rewards, 
whereas VBP is a budget-neutral design. 
Rosenthal et a!. was a longitudinal study of the ability ofP4P mechanisms to influence 
the quality of care involving outpatient measures in California physician groups.21 Rosenthal et 
a!. used data from PacifiCare Health Systems' P4P programs in California to determine quality 
of care in 10 clinical and service quality targets involving cervical cancer screening, 
mammography, and HbA!c over one year. As a control group, Rosenthal eta!. used data from 
PacifiCare Health Systems' groups in the Pacific Northwest (Oregon and Washington). 
Rosenthal et a!. did not provide comparison tables so it is difficult to determine the comparability 
of these different groups. Rosenthal eta!., however, did note that there were "no statistically 
significant differences in the trends between the 2 networks before the quality incentive 
program." Rosenthal eta!. found that, of the three categories, only cervical cancer screening 
resulted in a statistically significant difference between the two groups (absolute difference 
3.6%, p=.02). Given that PacifiCare paid $3.4 million in bonuses, Rosenthal eta!. concluded 
that this P4P program was not an efficient use of resources. 
Internal validity is fair. The two groups are difficult to compare given that Rosenthal et 
a!. provided no demographic data concerning either group, though Rosenthal did state that pre-
program treatment trends were similar. Regarding VBP, external validity is fair, given that VBP 
is an inpatient program with a budget neutral design. 
24 
Doran et a!. examined the effects of outpatient P4P programs on family practices in the 
UK.22 Doran eta!. used data from 8105 family practices in England in the first year of the P4P 
program to measure the performance for quaiity indicators in 10 clinical domains, including 
asthma, COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. Doran eta!. was also interested in the relationship 
between exception reporting (the means of excluding patients from P4P calculations) and overall 
performance. Doran found that median achievement (the proportion of eligible patients for 
whom targets were achieved) was 83.4 percent, ranging from 90.1% for DM to 96% for 
hypothyroidism. Exception reporting was low (median 6%) but ranged from 0% to 85.8%, with 
1.1% of practices excluding more than 15% of patients. Doran et al. believed that median 
achievement was high because the benchmarks of attainment were too low. Doran et al. also 
believed that gaming the system was uncommon, but widespread among a handful of practices 
(given the exception reporting data). 
Internal validity of this study is fair. Without any control groups, it is hard to isolate the 
amount of quality improvement is due to the P4P incentives. Regarding VBP, external validity 
is fair to poor, given that this is a different type of program (outpatient, positive incentives) in a 
different health care system. 
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THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE ROUNDTABLE ON HOSPITAL VALUE-
BASED PURCHASING 
Overview of the Senate Finance Committee Roundtable on Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing 
On March 6, 2008, the Senate Finance Connnittee, led by Senators Max Baucus and 
Charles Grassley, co-sponsors of the Medicare Value Purchasing Act of2005, convened a 
roundtable of participants representing a variety of health care viewpoints and with strong vested 
interest in the outcome ofVBP. Senator Grassley stated that "this trajectory of spending" could 
not continue, and that VBP was one way to "bend this long-term growth" while "ensuring that 
the patients get the best possible care."23 The Senate Finance Connnittee was looking for 
diversity in opinions and suggestions regarding VBP, stating that in striving "for a system that 
provides health care that's safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable," 
much remained " to be discussed, explored, and decided. "24 
Representatives of academia (Dr. Meredith Rosenthal of the Harvard School of Public 
Health), patient groups (the Connnonwealth Fund), quality endorsement (National Quality 
Forum [NQF]), payer groups (CMS, Blue Cross Blue Shield of America [BCBSA], National 
Business Group on Health), hospital groups (Association of American Medical Colleges 
[AAMC], American Hospital Association [AHA], the Billings Clinic, Federation of American 
Hospitals [FAH], Alegent Health, and Premier Health Alliance), and professional groups 
(American College of Surgeons [ ACS], the American Nursing Association [ANA], the American 
Organization of Nurse Executives [AONE], and the Society of Hospital Medicine [SHM]), 
industry groups (the American Hospital Association, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, the 
Federation of American Hospitals, Alegent Health, the National Business Group on Health, and 
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Premier Inc.) were all present. Interestingly, the AMA was not present at the Roundtable, and 
we raise possible reasons for their exclusion elsewhere in this paper. The Senate Finance 
Committee asked specific questions involving performance standards, quality measures, 
structure of incentives, and implementation.Z5 The participants used this valuable opportunity to 
voice their concerns about and suggestions for CMS's VBP proposal to the Senate Finance 
Committee. Some participants chose to answer each question one by one, whereas others used 
their time as a platform for protecting and promoting the interests of their particular constituents 
that might be threatened or not well-represented by the new plan. 
Performance Standards 
Only four respondents even mentioned minimum thresholds, with only one (Premier) in 
favor. Two respondents (Dr. Rosenthal and BCBSA) discouraged the use of minimum 
thresholds, as minimum thresholds would "discourage the poorest performing hospitals from 
engaging in quality improvement."26 Five respondents endorsed CMS's proposed combination 
of attainment scores and improvement scores. ACS emphasized the importance of improvement 
over baseline attainment, concerned that "high performance" rewards would exacerbate the 
physician shortage.Z7 Dr. Rosenthal also suggested an alternative to CMS' s proposal, stating that 
prorating a fixed reward by percentage of achievement would eliminate arbitrary cutoffs for 
reward.Z6 
Quality Measures 
The vast majority of respondents trusted in the NQF in the process of measures selection 
and development. Of the 14 respondents addressing this issue, 12 respondents named the NQF 
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in response to the question about the process used to develop, test, refine, endorse, adopt, and 
retire quality measures. Three respondents (NQF, ANA, and BCBSA) only mentioned the NQF 
specifically as the organization of choice to be involved with measures selection and 
development, while six respondents identified the mechanism currently in use by the CMS for its 
reporting program (measures endorsed by the NQF, approved by the HQA) as the preferred 
mechanism for VBP. Three groups (Commonwealth Fund, Billings, and Dr. Rosenthal) 
identified the Joint Commission for possible involvement, while three groups (National Business 
Group, Commonwealth Fund, and Dr. Rosenthal) named the NCQA as part of the process. In 
addition, two groups (Commonwealth Fund and Dr. Rosenthal) mentioned the AHRQ as a 
possibility as well. One group, the ACS, believed that the process used by the NQF to endorse 
measures was "onerous and too slow" and needed to "mature to meet the needs of a true value-
based purchasing system."27 
As for the types of measures used, only three respondents, Dr. Rosenthal, Billings, and 
the Commonwealth Fund, specifically emphasized the importance of process measures, though 
the relative silence on the question of process measures could have resulted from their extant 
emphasis in P4P programs such as the Premier HQID. Four respondents mentioned outcomes 
measures, with the Commonwealth Fund noting that outcomes were "the bottom line in health 
care."28 However, both Dr. Rosenthal and the Commonwealth Fund urged caution with the use 
of outcomes in VBP, given that outcomes measures could "make the VBP system vulnerable to 
inappropriate incentives"28 such as adverse selection, while Premier urged the exclusion of 30-
day mortality measures because they "do not currently provide adequate feedback for hospitals 
to evaluate their performance."29 Two respondents (the Commonwealth Fund and Dr. 
Rosenthal) also mentioned the inclusion of structural measures. Six respondents stressed the 
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importance of patient-centered measures such as HCAHPS, though Premier urged caution with 
HCAHPS, indicating that "more experience needs to be obtained."29 One respondent, the ACS, 
asked for measures that were longitudinal and measured efficiency. Two respondents (ACS and 
FAH) endorsed the use of composite measures in order to be "direct drivers of outcomes,"27 
while Dr. Rosenthal warned that all-or-none measures make sense "only if there is a clinical 
reason to believe that there is little value to each measure at the margin, unless they are all 
accomplishedtogether."26 In response to the question of how often CMS should review 
measures, three groups (AAMC, the Commonwealth Fund, and Dr. Rosenthal) stated annually, 
while the BCBSA stated 18-24 months, based on its own program for Blue Distinction Centers. 
Structure of Incentives 
Of the seven respondents who addressed the initial size of the incentive, only the 
Commonwealth Fund believed that CMS's proposed 2-5% of base DRG payment was 
reasonable. Four respondents believed that the reward should be 2% or less; the AHA claimed 
that 2-5% would be "excessive for an untested system,"30 while others cited the effectiveness of 
smaller rewards in other CMS programs such as Hospital Compare and Premier HQID?9 Four 
respondents stated that incentives should be applied to specific conditions as opposed to all 
DRGs, while one respondent, the Commonwealth Fund, argued that certain broader measures 
that were not condition-specific could be better applied at the provider level.31 
Eight respondents indicated the importance of aligning hospital and physician incentives, 
but they offered few suggestions as to how to accomplish this. Dr. Rosenthal indicated that 
"there is no published evidence on this question" but suggested that "paying attending physicians 
for improving the same evidence-based processes or reducing inpatient complications would 
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encourage productive collaboration of a kind that is unlikely to occur otherwise. "26 The F AH 
suggested that the NQF was investigating the problem, whereas the NQF stated that coordination 
of measure development should assure that measures "roll up" (e.g., infection rates calculated the 
same way), be setting-neutral, apply common conventions, and aggregate in composites or 
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summary metncs. 
Eight respondents directly or indirectly opposed the principle of budget neutrality in 
VBP. None of the respondents endorsed the concept of budget neutrality. 
BCBSA argued that budget neutrality would "make it difficult for low performers to 
improvement in succeeding years."33 The AHA stated that "any perception that these efforts are 
about budget cutting and not performance improvement will sour the kind of change that 
everyone would like to see in care delivery."30 The AONE warned that any VBP system "used 
punitively and arbitrarily to reduce payments to hospitals" would "be devastating to hospitals 
and have negative consequences ... to the nursing staffs ... and the communities they serve."34 
The FAH believed that "the overall incentive payment should ensure that sufficient funds be 
targeted at the lower performing hospitals."35 Finally, according to Premier, VBP should "create 
a positive incentive to improve performance."29 
Implementation 
All seven respondents addressing the issue of included hospital types asserted that CMS 
must make special consideration for rural and safety-net hospitals. Two respondents (F AH and 
Premier) insisted that CMS must establish some special arrangement involving minimum 
number of cases, with the F AH arguing that CMS should allow opt-outs for conditions with 
fewer than 25 cases. Four respondents believed that the CMS should provide some sort of 
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assistance for rural and safety-net hospitals in the form of education, technical support, or 
financial assistance. 
Where They Sit: Advocacy 
14 respondents seized the opportunity to advocate for their constituents' interests 
concerning VBP. The AAMC emphasized that teaching hospitals were special institutions 
whose situations VBP might not recognize adequately and in fact potentially harm. On 28 
occasions, the AAMC extolled the benefits of teaching hospitals to the health care system, 
particularly emphasizing their role in research and caring for complex and severely ill patients, 
as well as the difficulty in measuring performance adequately for these special cases. The 
AAMC stated that "teaching hospitals are unique and vital to health care delivery and scientific 
discovery'' and "disproportionately treat complex and severely ill patients who often present with 
multiple co-morbidities and serious, or rare, complications of routine medical conditions."36 In 
addition, the AAMC stated that they "provide unique services not found at other hospitals 
including transplantation, trauma and burn care, participation in clinical trials, and other 
services" and also "serve as a safety net" and "train future physicians." The AAMC feared that 
"VBP poses unique challenges," especially concerning the "uniform approach to Hospital 
Acquired Conditions" and the fact that "POA coding may be neglected because it sacrifices life-
saving care." The AAMC also worried about how VBP would address the complexity of care 
and teaching arrangements in teaching hospitals. The AAMC concluded by hoping that "VBP 
does no harm to the nation's teaching hospitals." 
The AONE used the roundtable as a platform to address the severe shortage of nurses in 
the US on 24 different occasions. The AONE cited 13 studies and reports indicating the harms 
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of nursing shortages as well as the benefits of an enlarged nursing workforce. 34 The AONE 
emphasized that "nursing is a key partner in sustaining quality outcomes" and warned against 
treating nursing as a fixed cost, as the current system ofDRGs does. The AONE concluded by 
stating that nursing and nursing care have "taken on critical importance" in efforts "to ensure 
patient safety at every level of care." The ANA promoted nursing interests, urging for the 
inclusion of nursing sensitive measures on 12 different occasions. The ANA stressed that VBP 
"fails to include the central provider (the nurse) and fails to recognize nurses' extensive 
contributions" and insisted that "implementation ofVBP without reporting nursing indicators 
would be incomplete."37 Meanwhile, SHM reminded the Committee of the prominent role that 
hospitalists had in quality improvement. On 11 occasions, the SHM mentioned that hospitalists 
"serve key leadership roles" and lead quality improvement projects concerning best practices, 
discharge planning protocols, and quality measure development.38 
Both the ACS and AHA worried about the unintended consequences of an unproven plan 
for their constituents. The ACS, on 15 different occasions, emphasized that VBP was "still in 
early stages of development," current data did not support the efficacy of this new system, and 
that CMS had inadequately developed the currently proposed system.27 The AHA, on 7 
occasions, feared that the proposal contained too many unknowns, stating that "the report lays 
out a variety of options but stops short of recommending a specific design," that "pay-for-
performance is a policy that is still largely untested and unproven," and urged Congress to "move 
forward cautiously, mindful of unintended consequences."30 
Both the Billings Clinic and the Commonwealth Fund took advantage of the opportunity 
to promote the interests of rural and underserved populations. The Billings Clinic, on 7 
occasions, described rural providers as eager to participate and brought major positive attributes 
32 
with their integrated models of care, but that lower volumes would place a premium on process 
over outcomes.39 The Commonwealth, on two occasions, promoted the needs of vulnerable 
populations with their concern that a reliance on outcomes would make VBP vulnerable to 
inappropriate incentives, such as avoidance of sicker patients.31 
Finally, both NQF and Premier used this opportunity to advocate for their continued 
inclusion on future CMS programs. The NQF, on six different occasions, wished to protect its 
prominent role in endorsing measures for VBP, stating that "NQF endorsement ... has become 
the 'gold standard' for health care performance measures" and that "major health care 
purchasers, including CMS, rely on NQF-endorsed measures to ensure that measures are 
scientifically sound and meaningful and to help standardize performance measures across the 
industry."32 Premier, which held a pivotal role in data collection and management in the Premier 
HQID program, defended its potential role in VBP on three occasions by stating that "part of the 
success of the HQID project ... can be attributed to the support provided for project participants" 
and that "Premier has facilitated the distribution of best practices amongst all participants and 
provided consulting support for hospitals with lower levels of performance. "29 
Where They Stand: Support for VBP 
The lone representative of academia, Dr. Rosenthal, supported VBP. Dr. Rosenthal 
believed that the "proposed hospital incentive program represents another step toward a more 
enlightened role for Medicare as an agent for delivery system improvement" and that "the 
alternative (allowing payment and performance to remain unrelated) is no longer tenable. "26 Dr. 
Rosenthal felt that VBP "should proceed based on sound principles and evidence as to what 
works." The NQF also supported VBP. NQF "strongly" urged Congress to pass VBP 
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legislation, believing that there existed "much potential to enhance the quality of health care," 
and "standardized performance measurement and reporting system is a fundamental building 
block for creating a national health care system that provides high quality service and is 
affordable and accessible to all Americans."32 The lone representative of patient interests, The 
Commonwealth Fund supported VBP as well. The Commonwealth Fund stated that there was 
"reason to believe that substantial progress in both quality and efficiency should be possible" and 
that the "the quality of care across areas does not correspond to spending."23 The 
Commonwealth Fund added that "VBP should reflect a broad view of value" and that "paying 
for high performance rewards achievement." 
The payer groups generally supported VBP. BCBSA was "concerned that health care is 
unaffordable" and supported "changing incentives to promote better care."33 BCBSA noted that 
"providers are generally paid based on services provided" and asserted that "incentives must be 
changed." BCBSA concluded that "implementing VBP would help change reimbursement from 
paying for more to paying for quality." The National Business Group, the most enthusiastic 
supporter ofVBP among the industry groups, "strongly (urged) Congress to pass legislation that 
would implement pay-for-performance on a widespread basis in the Medicare program," 
believing that "it is necessary for the financial future of Medicare as well as for the quality and 
safety of care ... that pay-for-performance be used to harness the government's leverage as the 
largest purchaser of health care in the US to move Medicare and all other payers towards paying 
for effective health care and quality outcomes rather than units or volume of services."40 The 
group emphasized that "too often payment made without regard to whether services are needed" 
and hoped that "CMS is taking the next step towards moving from being primarily a passive 
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payer for health care to an active purchaser for health care, using its enormous power to buy 
the best possible care for millions of beneficiaries. [Emphasis in origina[j" 
The hospital groups were much less supportive ofVBP. The AAMC was concerned that 
VBP was not ready for full adoption, stating that the use of existing coding systems for complex 
patients could have "serious, unintended consequences" and that "such a program will present 
challenges both to hospitals and CMS to implement."36 The AAMC added that "there remains 
considerable need for progress on a research agenda for studying financial incentives in health 
care." 
The AHA expressed concern about the untested nature ofVBP and unintended 
consequences that might result from widespread implementation. The AHA stated that "the 
report lays out a variety of options but stops short of recommending a specific design" and urged 
Congress "to move forward cautiously, mindful of unintended consequences."30 The AHA 
added that "past initiatives were expected to resolve hospital quality issues, but more work 
remains to be done." The AHA asserted that "the additional implementation of a value-based 
program will be challenging and resource intensive." The AHA expressed concern that "CMS 
Acting Administrator Kerry Weems indicated that Congress could achieve budget savings by 
retaining some or all of the unspent reward funding, which would mean that implementation of 
the pay-for-performance plan could create a 'backdoor' budget cut for hospitals" and warned that 
"any perception that these efforts are about budget cutting will sour change." The AHA 
conceded that "using incentives is an important concept worth exploring" but insisted that "pay-
for-performance is a policy idea that is still largely untested and unproven." 
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Billings also was reluctant to endorse VBP. Billings noted that VBP "may well present 
the opportunity to improve quality and reduce costs," but cautioned that VBP "will require 
significant refinement" and "a plan for policy makers to stick with a Value-Based Purchasing 
framework ... over 10-15 years will take vision and persistence, something often difficult to 
achieve in a complex political environment."39 The F AH expressed similar reluctance to endorse 
VBP. The FAH considered itself a "strong proponent of quality and performance measurement." 
The F AH "supports moving to a payment system that links payment to performance" but urged 
Congress "to proceed carefully."35 The FAH felt that "our national quality infrastructure does 
not have sufficient methodologies for determining if patient outcomes are better because of 
process measures being employed as part of patient care routines." 
Of the hospital groups, only Premier supported VBP. Premier was "highly concerned 
that VBP is intended to generate $1.65 billion in savings to the Medicare program over five 
years," believing instead that "VBP must be used to drive change and create incentives for 
continuous quality improvement" through "quality gains ... reinvested in hospitals participating 
in the program."29 Nevertheless, Premier believed that "Congress should act now to enact a 
hospital value-based purchasing program" because "accelerating health care performance 
improvement is imperative to patients and our economy." 
A majority of professional groups did not support VBP. The ACS, in particular, was a 
very strong critic ofVBP. The ACS warned that VBP was "still in early stages of development," 
with "few data indicating measures are moving us toward our goals."27 The ACS also 
complained that "current measures sets still require more testing," and VBP measure sets 
"currently lack measures that are longitudinal." In addition, the ACS felt that "patient-shared 
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decision-making is a critical missing link." Also, the ACS believed that the amount of incentive 
"has been adequately addressed." 
The ANA and AONE also took cautious stands. The ANA made no explicit mention of 
support, though it did insist that CMS "re-examine payment structure and recognize the value of 
nursing" by including nursing sensitive measures.37 The AONE asked that VBP "be fair and 
improve quality and performance," and also emphasized that VBP "not be used punitively and 
arbitrarily to reduce payments to hospitals."34 The AONE, as a subsidiary, aligned its message 
somewhat closely with that of the AHA, though the AONE did not include any comments about 
the lack of readiness of VBP. 
SHM was the only professional group in support ofVBP. The SHM, an enthusiastic 
supporter ofVBP, stated that it "shares (CMS's) commitment to improving the efficiency and 
the quality of our health care system. "38 The SHM agreed with CMS in that "reforms that align 
Medicare payments more closely with the quality of care provided, rather than reward volume of 
services as the current system does, are urgently needed" and added that "America's hospitalists 
stand ready to work with you in achieving this important objective." In addition, SHM "supports 
CMS' s efforts to implement policies designed to promote the delivery of care that is safe, 
effective, timely patient centered, efficient, and equitable" and concluded that "SHM strongly 
supports CMS 's proposal to reward hospitals based upon performance improvement and 
attainment of a minimal quality threshold." 
37 
STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES 
Rationale 
While I found the responses to the VBP Roundtable to be very useful given that they 
represented a wide range of health care interests and generally answered the same set of 
questions, I also decided to draw responses directly from key stakeholders in the health care 
industry. I wanted the opportunity to interview these stakeholders, none of whom had previously 
seen the interview questions, in order to obtain spontaneous and non-scripted responses. In 
addition, I hoped to obtain viewpoints from these stakeholders that the VBP Roundtable 
questions did not address. 
Methods 
I created a list of questions about P4P and VBP and submitted the questions for IRB 
approval, at which point the IRB declared his project exempt from IRB approval as it was not 
human subjects research. I identified candidate respondents who were key stakeholders involved 
with or influenced by the VBP program, and who represented a variety of positions and sides of 
the issue. I then submitted a standardized letter via e-mail to each candidate respondent asking 
for his or her permission for an interview about CMS's inpatient P4P initiatives and the VBP 
proposal. Upon receiving a positive response, I arranged a mutually agreeable interview time 
with the respondent's assistant over the phone or in person. Before the start of the interview, I 
informed each respondent of my intent to record the interview using a digital voice recorder, 
transcribe the interview, and use the respondent's name, title, and direct quotes from the 
interview for the paper, and asked for consent from the respondent for each of these conditions. 
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Once I received consent, I began the interview (see the interview protocol in Appendix 3). The 
interviews ranged from 22 minutes to 90 minutes in length. Upon completion of the interview, I 
offered to send the respondent a copy of the transcript and a copy of the completed paper. I 
searched through the responses for each question and coded the responses relative to each 
prompt, measuring the respondent's relative stand on each issue, using occurrences of key 
phrases and ideas in the response. For example, I might code responses based on approval or 
disapproval of a certain concept raised in the prompt, such as budget neutrality. Afterwards, I 
used a third-party reader not involved with this paper to review a small sample of the coding 
results independently. Our intercoder agreement was 95%. Where there were disagreements, we 
identified the sources of disagreement and resolved the differences in each case. 
The Respondents 
The respondents are Jeffrey Spade, Vice President of theN orth Carolina Hospital 
Association; Nancy Foster, Vice President for Quality and Patient Safety Policy of the American 
Hospital Association; Brian Goldstein, Executive Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs, UNC 
School of Medicine, and Chief of Staff, UNC Health Care System; and Thomas Valuck, Medical 
Officer and Senior Adviser in the Center for Medicare Management of the CMS. Mr. Spade 
speaks from the viewpoint of hospitals, especially rural and underserved hospitals. Ms. Foster 
also represents the viewpoint of hospitals, though in a more nationwide and global fashion. Dr. 
Goldstein speaks as an academic and a representative of physicians. Finally, Dr. Valuck 
represents the payer perspective, particularly the perspective of the largest payer, the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services. 
39 
The Responses 
Three of the four respondents (Mr. Spade, Dr. Goldstein, and Dr. Valuck) felt that 
Medicare was a logical place in which to implement a pay-for-performance payment system. 
Mr. Spade commented that "Medicare has been one of the innovators in terms of payment 
structure for health care" and therefore was an appropriate setting "to introduce innovation to 
payment structure and reimbursement system." Dr. Goldstein felt that Medicare was "a 
reasonable place to start." Dr. Valuck said that CMS, as "the biggest payer," had "a fiduciary 
responsibility for the Medicare trust fund" and was "seeking to provide leadership in VBP." Ms. 
Foster, however, while agreeing "that Medicare is, as the largest payer of hospital services, is in 
many respects a logical place to do VBP," warned that "significant challenges" within a "very 
complicated payment system that has more pages of regulation than the IRS" as well as 
payments that fail to "get you back up to your total cost" in addition to any penalties "may mean 
you aren't able to deliver care that needs to be delivered." 
When asked to identifY supporters ofP4P, two of four respondents (Mr. Spade and Ms. 
Foster) identified payer groups as likely supporters. Mr. Spade said that "the payers themselves 
would be one group because they want to be sure they're getting the highest value," while Ms. 
Foster stated that "the main advocates thus far have been certainly been employers and other 
purchasers other than Medicare who believe that essentially you get what you pay for." Two of 
four respondents (Mr. Spade and Dr. Goldstein) identified providers and physicians as most 
likely to be opposed to P4P on principle. Mr. Spade stated that "physicians don't like the 
constraint of performance system that requires that they be judged by standards" since it "seems 
constraining to patient care." Dr. Goldstein believed that "physicians in small practices, 
especially rural practices, and physicians more generally may object depending on the 
40 
documentation, data collection, (and) recording." On the other hand, Dr. Valuck disagreed with 
the concept of advocates and opponents in reference to P4P, stating instead that "we all share the 
goal of using correctly-aligned incentives to encourage better quality and avoid unnecessary 
costs in care." 
Three respondents (Mr. Spade, Ms. Foster, and Dr. Valuck) took neutral stances on the 
question of physician buy-in. Mr. Spade stated that "physicians can see the value in a payment 
system that optimizes performance" but added that "they're skeptical of whether the government 
can do it right and make it work well." Ms. Foster believed that physician understanding ofP4P 
was "for the most part limited at this point" and that "physicians across the continuum really 
need to understand what's going on and its implications to patient care." Dr. Valuck believed 
that physicians "agree with the premise that payment should reward better quality of care and 
their efforts to avoid unnecessary costs of care" but added that physicians "question whether we 
have the right measures and the right infrastructure yet for them to be successful under that kind 
of program." Dr. V aluck did say that VBP measures "are all measures that have been developed 
by professionals for professional accountability." 
In response to whether P4P had the ability to reduce cost while improving quality, three 
of the four respondents (Mr. Spade, Ms. Foster, and Dr. Valuck) agreed. Mr. Spade believed 
P4P had "great potential to improve quality," citing Premier HQID as evidence that P4P "can 
drive down costs as well as improve aspects of outcome performance like mortality (and) 
complications like mistakes," though he cautioned that "I would never claim that everyone has it 
figured out right." Ms. Foster agreed that P4P "has that potential," believing that "it has a 
number of opportunities to really incentivize people to provide care that is not only high quality 
but also eliminates unnecessary steps in health care" and "drive down costs." Ms. Foster also 
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issued the caveat that "it's not universally true that whatever one would want to incentivize 
would necessarily drive down costs, at least not in the short run." Dr. Valuck also agreed that 
"VBP can increase the quality of care while avoiding unnecessary costs," adding that P4P held 
"a lot of potential in beneficial effects, including ... rewarding those who are successful in 
enhancing efficiency in care, and also providing data for public reporting, which informs 
consumers and also creates a bit of a competitive incentive to perform well vis-it-vis your peers." 
Dr. Goldstein, while believing that "some of the measures that are included in most P4P 
programs can achieve that (goal)," such as "preventing a hospital-acquired infection," also 
presented a counterexample of"managing diabetics," which might require "more medication, 
more office visits, (and) more frequent phone calls." 
All four respondents agreed that P4P programs had the potential to lead to unintended 
consequences such as adverse patient selection and data gaming. Of the four respondents, only 
Ms. Foster allowed that unintended consequences were "very much a concern." Ms. Foster 
stated that "comments ... were made (by the AHA) last year when CMS was floating its VBP 
white paper" stating that "regardless ofhow you define the system, there's a potential for 
unintended consequences." She believed that "a responsible approach required a strong and 
ongoing evaluation of the system and its impact in order to prevent unintended consequences." 
Mr. Spade agreed that there was "always the potential" for unintended consequences "when you 
adjust the system to create a certain outcome," adding that a system like P4P might encourage 
"fraudulent" behavior. However, Mr. Spade added that "I think (fraudulent behavior is) at the 
margin" given that "Medicare and Medicaid have a history of understanding what's appropriate 
patient care and how to audit that and a good structure in place to do that." For example, 
according to Mr. Spade, "DRG was subject to gaming for a long time ... (and now) there are 
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audit structures in place to watch for fraudulent behavior." Mr. Spade also added that "adverse 
selection is minimal," given that "physicians are controlling the admissions processes" and "it 
would be very difficult for a physician to say, 'I'm not admitting this difficult patient to this 
hospital."' Dr. Goldstein stated that while "the potential is there," he added that "it's not clear to 
what degree hospitals have the ability to manipulate the system that way even if they want to." 
Dr. Goldstein concluded that the potential for unintended consequences had "a lot has to do with 
the way the program is structured." Dr. V aluck, while agreeing that "any payment policy has the 
potential for unintended consequences, especially with a relatively new application of a 
concept," also asserted that P4P "has a lot of promise for actually addressing some of the current 
unintended consequences of our payment system, particularly misaligned incentives." Dr. 
V aluck agreed with Dr. Goldstein that the potential for unintended consequences "depends on 
how VBP is applied and how it's monitored." Both Mr. Foster and Dr. Valuck agreed that a 
potential means of avoiding unintended consequences would be to align hospital and physician 
behavior. Mr. Foster said that "hospital P4P needs to be aligned with physician behavior that's 
being driven by a physician payment structure," while Dr. V aluck stated that "aligning measures 
across various settings of care would lead to more harmonized incentives and better care 
coordination." 
None of the respondents believed that EMRs were required for the successful 
implementation ofP4P programs, but three respondents (Mr. Spade, Dr. Goldstein, and Dr. 
Valuck) believed that EMRs would certainly be helpful. Mr. Spade believed that while he"( did 
not think) it's always necessary to achieve good outcomes," he also had "no doubt that the more 
information you have that allows you to design great optimal care for patients, and that includes 
health IT." Dr. Goldstein stated that EMRs were "not required ... but they help with case 
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finding, they help with data collection, they help with ... putting data together." Dr. Valuck 
agreed, stating that EMRs were "not required" but "would certainly facilitate the adoption and 
effectiveness ofVBP models." Ms. Foster, on the other hand, felt that there were "enormous 
issues around trying to embed (EMR) in a VBP system," specifying that "not all hospitals can 
afford IT" and that "history around implementation of EMR in hospitals" suggested that there 
were "far too many places where they brought a system up and the physicians found it 
cumbersome and refused to use it." 
In response to whether data transparency was important for success ofP4P programs, Dr. 
Valuck stated that "publicly accessible information is highly desirable" because "public 
reporting provides a non-financial incentive for health care providers to improve their 
performance." In addition, Dr. V aluck said that transparency "provides very useful information 
for decision-making, for consumers and for purchasers to make better informed decisions about 
health care that's being provided in their communities." Dr. Valuck added that transparency 
would help create "a competitive playing field" through "non-financial incentives" that 
"encourage providers to focus on improving their performance." On the other hand, both Mr. 
Spade and Dr. Goldstein believed that transparency was helpful but not necessary. Mr. Spade 
stated that transparency was "necessary to drive improvement" but "isn't necessary to gain 
improvement," since "improvement will happen without transparency because people will be 
driven by the payment system." However, Mr. Spade added that "transparency can drive greater 
value out of improvement." Dr. Goldstein felt that Hospital Compare was "not bad because it 
lists every individual measure, and most of those are process measures," which in turn told the 
viewer "a little about the kind of care that's being provided." However, Dr. Goldstein expressed 
great concern about "all-or-none scoring (or) optimal care scoring," which to Dr. Goldstein "is a 
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bad thing and takes it too far." Dr. Goldstein believed that getting "the same amount of credit or 
blame for each individual measure" did not "accurately (reflect)the quality of care." 
Three of four respondents (Mr. Spade, Dr. Goldstein, and Dr. V aluck) agreed on the 
importance of patient perception of care. Mr. Spade stated that "patient satisfaction is key to 
performance and has real value" but added that "I'm not willing to say we have it right" and 
suggested that patient satisfaction measures might "have to be tweaked quite a bit." Dr. 
Goldstein felt that patient satisfaction was "a legitimate variable" and that "the patient's loyalty 
determined by how they perceive the way they were treated should be part of the equation." Dr. 
V aluck felt that patient experience data was "very important" and that performance assessment 
should address "all of the six key dimensions of quality." However, Ms. Foster, while believing 
that patient satisfaction was important, felt that HCAHPS was so new that its use could lead to 
"unintended consequences" and that CMS would "need experience with the measure to 
understand if it is measuring what you think it's going to measure." Ms. Foster added that 
HCAHPS surveys were not offered in languages other than English and Spanish, thus excluding 
"sections of care on a whole important part of the patient population." Ms. Foster also used the 
idea that HCAHPS might be "rewarding (hospitals) for new construction" of buildings as an 
example of "things that you want to think about when you design a P4P system to reward 
hospitals." 
Three respondents (Mr. Spade, Ms. Foster, and Dr. Valuck) believed that small and rural 
hospitals faced special disadvantages from VBP. Dr. Goldstein declined to answer as he 
believed himself not to be qualified. Mr. Spade argued that rural hospitals required government 
investment in the form of health IT and "helping hospitals invest in systems of care." All three 
respondents agreed that small volume was a critical problem for small and rural hospitals. Mr. 
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Spade stated that with small volume, "your variation can be broad." Ms. Foster said that "it's 
really problematic with small sample size to know what a rewardable performance is." Dr. 
V aluck added that "when numbers of cases are too small, the results can be skewed based on 
small numbers related to particular instances may not be generalizable in their populations." All 
three respondents also agreed that CMS might need to adjust the P4P structure in order to 
accommodate small and rural hospitals. Mr. Spade stated that "there needs to be more thought 
how P4P works for those hospitals" and that "it's up to the government to understand how P4P 
affects those organizations differently, so they can meet the challenges ofP4P systems." Ms. 
Foster said that "the measures aren't well-designed to measure the care largely provided in small 
and rural hospitals" and "it does require more thought than just applying the same system in the 
same way that you would to a 250-bed community hospital." Dr. Valuck suggested that, as one 
option, CMS "could select measures specifically relevant to small hospitals, look at a longer time 
frame, let's say two years of data instead of one, to presumably get twice as much data," or 
consider "various statistical techniques." 
When asked about the goals that the Premier HQID program meant to accomplish, Mr. 
Spade felt that they included "the concept of hospitals working together, sharing information and 
implementing great design principles for patient care." Ms. Foster believed that Premier HQID 
"was intended to look at whether hospitals would respond to incentives in payment and 
accelerate their improvement in performance as a result." Dr. Goldstein thought that "the goals 
were to demonstrate that care could be improved without increasing costs." Dr. V aluck stated 
that the primary goal was "to test whether financial incentives and public recognition- the 
financial and non-financial incentives- could be effective in stimulating quality improvement." 
Overall, all four respondents were very enthusiastic about the accomplishments of Premier 
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HQID. Mr. Spade noted that through the Premier HQID program, "there was less variation, 
overall increase in performance in terms of outcome, and a general improvement in cost." Mr. 
Spade added that "by working together and creating some formal structure to share information," 
hospitals "learn from each other and make changes in their performance," though Mr. Spade 
cautioned that "I'm not sure that the performance incentive is structured correctly to drive the 
investments necessary to drive performance increase" and that the hospitals "figured out how to 
work together to drive performance, and I'm not sure the payment structure is what drove it." 
Ms. Foster believed that Premier HQID "absolutely marvelous job showing that a group of 
highly motivated group of hospitals intent on quality can succeed." Dr. Goldstein believed that 
Premier HQID "made progress demonstrating the fact that you can improve care without 
substantially increasing cost of care." Dt. Valuck, while noting that the results were still 
preliminary, noted that "the demo showed pretty dramatic positive results, even against a 
background of general improvement likely stimulated by the advent of hospital public reporting 
on Hospital Compare." 
All three respondents asked about measures (Mr. Spade, Ms. Foster, and Dr. Goldstein) 
agreed that VBP should include process measures. Mr. Spade stated that "there's no doubt 
process measures make sense." Ms. Foster agreed that "the best measures to hold hospitals 
accountable include process of care measures." Dr. Goldstein noted that "process measures have 
gotten refined enough at this point" that they were "hard to argne with." Mr. Spade, Ms. Foster, 
and Dr. Goldstein all agreed that VBP should also include patient satisfaction measures. Mr. 
Spade stated that "if we don't start including (patient satisfaction measures), we'll never learn 
what aspect of that information should be driving performance." Ms. Foster agreed with 
including "patients' experience of care ... where clearly it's within (the hospitals') control." Dr. 
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Goldstein felt that patient satisfaction measures were "reasonable to be part of the equation" as 
long as they were similar to the HCAHPS survey. All three respondents were hesitant to endorse 
outcomes measures as part ofVBP. Mr. Spade believed that investigators "need to figure out 
more about outcomes" and felt unsure that "mortality is the only outcome we require." Ms. 
Foster questioned whether outcomes measures were "actually showing and whether or not one 
would be rewarding based on something truly within the control of the hospital." Ms. Foster also 
worried that "it could easily lead to unintended consequences ... where people are less eager to 
admit patients who are several ill or likely to have complications of care." Dr. Goldstein 
believed that outcomes measures would experience problems with "risk adjustments and the 
kinds of patients you accept in the first place." 
Two respondents (Mr. Spade and Ms. Foster) recommended that NQF endorse all 
measures for VBP. Mr. Spade appreciated the "quasi-public" structure ofNQF and thought that 
"the structure to (endorse measures) well is in place." Ms. Foster also approved the use ofHQA 
as a supplier of measures for public reporting. In response to incentivizing attainment versus 
improvement, Mr. Spade believed that incentivizing improvement was "a good idea in 
transition," but after a transition period, the government would "want a system that clearly 
rewards high performance." Dr. Goldstein thought the combination of attainment and 
improvement scores was "a big plus" and "makes it a lot easier for hospitals to collaborate." 
Two of three respondents (Mr. Spade and Dr. Valuck) believe that there is enough 
evidence to support VBP's effectiveness. Mr. Spade cited the Premier HQID program as 
evidence to the ability ofP4P to improve process and decrease variation and indicated that 
"we're at that natural evolution point where we need to start moving in that direction (ofP4P)." 
Dr. V aluck stated that there was "so much intuitive appeal and so much good early evidence 
48 
from CMS' demos and private sector experience that CMS is proceeding forward." Dr. Valuck, 
however, also added that CMS needed to "perform evaluation and monitoring to make sure that 
we don't somehow dilute the positive aspects with potential unintended consequences." While 
Dr. Goldstein"( didn't) think we can wait double-blind placebo-controlled trials for everything," 
he also stated that "the new system has to be nimble enough to adjust quickly." Dr. Goldstein 
illustrated this by arguing that if data showed that the practice supported in VBP's measures was 
"not the ideal treatment," and a physician instead used the latest data for a different treatment, 
"you'll get dinged on that measure." 
On the important issue of budget neutrality, two respondents (Dr. Goldstein and Dr. 
V aluck) believed that VBP could be viable as a budget neutral program, while the other two 
respondents (Mr. Spade and Ms. Foster) did not. Dr. Goldstein believed budget neutrality was 
"reasonable" and an "incentive for all of us to try to work at high quality but also efficiently." 
Dr. Goldstein did admit that he would "rather see this direction than some other worse 
alternative, which would be rationing of some other kind." Dr. Valuck defended budget 
neutrality by citing economic literature that stated that "the most effective incentive occurs when 
an individual or organization has lost somet]llng that they need to earn back," which he stated 
provided "more powerful incentives than simply adding a bit more to what the individual or 
entity receives that they may not have counted on anyway." Mr. Spade disagreed, stating that 
the government must "make investments now to drive savings in the future." He added that "if 
we do not recognize that that investment is necessary, then we will not accomplish the 
improvement that we are seeking" and that if "the reimbursement system just moves payments 
from low performers to high performers, I think that that's an illogical approach." Ms. Foster 
agreed, stating that VBP "should be a system that provides rewards for hospitals" and that VBP 
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would be "not survivable if in fact it is about taking money away and cost cutting to hospitals." 
Like Mr. Spade, Ms. Foster felt that savings through "reduction in complications in care, the 
reductions in readmissions, the reductions on ongoing health care needs in those patients" would 
result in "newfound savings to actually reward improved performance." 
Two of four respondents (Mr. Spade and Ms. Foster) believed that budget neutrality 
could have a harmful effect on hospital collaboration. Mr. Spade believed that budget neutrality 
"forces the health care providers to compete with each other in a way that's counterproductive" 
and did not believe that "that drives the type of improvement we want." Mr. Spade added that 
"anything that helps hospitals work together is better than systems that drive us apart" and that 
"budget neutrality is a way to drive providers apart." Ms. Foster cited quality literature as 
evidence that "nothing has been as effective as these collaborations in driving quality 
improvement forward to high levels of attainment with a great deal of speed," and she worried 
that increased competition would lead to a "chilling effect on hospitals' willingness to share their 
secrets to success with each other." The other two respondents, Dr. Goldstein and Dr. Valuck, 
did not believe that budget neutrality, in practice, has harmed hospital collaboration. Dr. 
Goldstein had "seen mainly a lot of collaboration between hospitals" and concluded that "there's 
mostly positives right now" surrounding hospital collaboration in a budget neutral payment 
program. Dr. Valuck noted that hospitals participating in the Premier HQID program "readily 
shared best practices" and that any possible harmful effect on collaboration "hasn't been our 
experience." 
Only one of three respondents, Dr. Goldstein, believed that the size of the incentive 
proposed by CMS (2-5% ofDRG payments) was "a good range" and "enough to get the 
hospitals' attention." Ms. Foster believed that 2-5% "is a little high to start with" for "an 
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untested program" where literature has demonstrated "a pretty mixed result, as to whether P4P 
programs have actually attained their established goals." Ms. Foster instead advocated for I%, 
while doing "continuous ongoing assessment on the impact that P4P is having." Mr. Spade felt 
that CMS "(did not) have enough experience" though he would only say that "clearly there's 
only a small percent necessary to drive participation." 
When asked about the future ofVBP, all three respondents (Ms. Foster, Dr. Goldstein, 
and Dr. V aluck) believed that VBP was inevitable. However, only Ms. Foster was willing to 
guess that "within the next two years we'll see some movement" with "debates and decisions 
next year." Both Dr. Goldstein and Dr. Valuck, on the other hand, thought that adoption ofVBP, 
while inevitable, would not be fast. Dr. Goldstein believed VBP would experience a "slow 
adoption." Dr. V aluck agreed, stating that VBP adoption would be "incremental but steady." 
51 
DISCUSSION 
The Common Ground 
Despite differences on details, a majority of stakeholders agree on certain aspects of the 
VBP proposal. Most recognize that P4P has the ability to decrease costs while simultaneously 
increasing quality in many categories. Generally, every stakeholder at the VBP Roundtable and 
interviewed by this author believes that the implementation ofP4P into Medicare's payment 
system is inevitable and a logical idea at least in theory. All respondents believe that Premier's 
HQID program was a success and a good model upon which to build VBP, and many 
respondents have noted the effect of collaboration between hospitals to improve when even a 
small incentive . Hence, most respondents support (or are at least resigned to) the 
implementation ofP4P into Medicare's payment system as a means of improving quality and 
efficiency in health care, and most respondents have been encouraged by at least several years of 
pilot testing through Premier HQID that P4P is a viable payment system to achieve these goals 
through VBP. 
When asked about measures, virtually all respondents agree that process measures and 
patient centeredness measures are important for VBP, and most agree that CMS must perform 
more research regarding outcomes measures as these measures are vulnerable to unintended 
consequences such as adverse patient selection. In addition, CMS must carefully consider risk 
adjustment when dealing with outcomes measures. The vast majority of the stakeholders 
recognizes NQF as an appropriate endorser of measures for use by VBP, and most approve of the 
current method (measures endorsed by the NQF and selected by the HQA) of introducing 
measures for VBP. 
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Most endorse the incentive structure of a combined scoring system using both attainment 
and improvement scores as a fair method to reward a broad spectrum of providers. Premier 
HQID mainly rewarded those with high baseline performance and provided little incentive for 
hospitals with lower baseline performance to improve. However, the VBP proposal would also 
give those hospitals incentive by rewarding improvement as well. Respondents also feel that the 
use of minimum thresholds threatens to disincentivize providing superior quality of care. Most 
respondents believe that hospital and physician incentives must be aligned correctly for VBP to 
achieve its potential, but respondents offered few suggestions as to how to make achieve this 
goal, suggesting that the issue of alignment of hospital and physician incentives will be difficult 
to address. 
When asked about implementation, virtually all stakeholders believe that VBP must 
include special considerations for small and rural/safety net hospitals, given their smaller patient 
pool and financial fragility. None of the respondents believe that either EMRs or data 
transparency are necessary for the success ofVBP, but both would help improve the program. 
Most respondents have been impressed with the ability of the Hospital Compare website to elicit 
disclosure of data regarding performance on various quality measures. 
The Payers 
Despite a wide range of concordance among stakeholders on a variety of issues, 
differences in opinions between payer groups and provider groups are evident. Payer groups 
tend to be very interested in using VBP as a vehicle to reduce costs in addition to improving 
quality and efficiency of health care. Health care costs now consume roughly 15% of the 
nation's GDP and up to half of these costs may be due to unnecessary care.41 Most believe that 
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health care costs will only continue to rise until the economy can no longer sustain the costs. 
Given Medicare's purchasing power, many in the industry are watching closely to see whether 
the VBP proposal comes to fruition. It should be no surprise that all payers welcome a change in 
payment system from the largest health care payer which they hope would help the push to 
change all other payer systems to P4P as well. 
Not surprisingly, the payer groups are generally very supportive of CMS 's VBP proposal. 
Clearly, CMS, the sponsor of the VBP proposal, is in favor oftransitioning Medicare from a 
passive payer to an active purchaser of care, and CMS believes that its VBP proposal will be 
restructuring the payment system in the right direction. CMS 's decision not to reimburse for so-
called "never" events is a step in a similar direction of not reimbursing for unnecessary care or 
mistakes made during care. In formulating its VBP proposal, CMS wishes for "the right care for 
every person every time" and sees VBP as an opportunity to "improve quality and avoid 
unnecessary costs."42 The idea ofP4P, according to CMS, should be to decrease practice 
variation throughout the US and control skyrocketing health care costs. CMS has incorporated 
the lessons learned from Premier HQID in hopes of a better P4P program that CMS can 
effectively implement nationwide. VBP should no longer only benefit hospitals with high 
baseline performance, now that CMS has proposed a combined attainment/improvement score. 
CMS also believes in the viability of a budget-neutral design, which has sparked 
tremendous criticism among provider groups. Certainly in an atmosphere of aversion to raising 
taxes, a budget-neutral design is more politically feasible. Dr. Valuck also believes that a 
budget -neutral design adds a stronger incentive for hospitals to improve quality compared to a 
design that only adds positive incentive. The Premier HQID program currently operates with a 
budget-neutral design, and CMS has used data published by Premier to support the claim that 
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P4P can, with a budget-neutral design, improve the quality and efficiency of health care. CMS 
will likely continue advocating for a budget-neutral design for VBP, as that should increase the 
chances that the Senate Finance Committee would find this design more palatable than other 
discussed reimbursement options. 
The National Business Group on Health is the strongest supporter among the 
participating stakeholders at the VBP Roundtable. This group, which represents large private 
employers nationwide, "strongly (urges) Congress to pass legislation" involving VBP, given that 
Medicare often reimburses providers "without regard to whether services are needed."40 Private 
employers have, just like CMS, watched health care costs increase steadily and would like VBP 
to "harness the government's leverage as the largest purchaser of health care" in the US in order 
to "move Medicare and all other payers toward paying for effective health care and quality 
outcomes." Payers are already well aware of the "amplifier effect" following CMS's legally 
required policy no longer reimbursing for upcoding the DRGs for "never" events (in other 
words, gaining significant publicity leading to action). Private employers, believers in the ability 
ofP4P to reduce costs, are clearly waiting for VBP to become law in order to benefit from 
Medicare's "amplifier effect," given that any action to change Medicare's reimbursement system 
would have profound effects on the industry. Payers clearly see the opportunity to effect P4P 
programs as policy throughout private insurance, and they simply need for Medicare to exert its 
leverage in order to achieve widespread adoption. 
The Providers: Hospital Groups 
Hospital groups ·share similar goals with those of the payer groups with respect to 
increasing the quality and efficiency of health care while decreasing the ballooning costs 
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associated with Medicare. However, with respect to VBP, hospital groups differ from the payer 
groups in their opinions concerning the readiness of the program for full-scale adoption in 
Medicare, in addition to the structure of incentives and payments. Hospitals believe that CMS 
should use VBP primarily as an engine for improvement in quality and efficiency of health care, 
not as a method of cutting costs up front Hospitals reason that a program well-designed to 
improve quality and efficiency of health care should recognize savings in the long run that would 
more than make up for initial investment 
Not surprisingly, in contrast to the payer groups, and as previously suspected, the hospital 
groups are much more hesitant to support VBP than were the payer groups. Overall, the larger 
organizations representing multiple hospitals, such as the AHA and AAMC, tend to be more 
suspicious ofVBP, while representatives of smaller hospital organizations, are less suspicious 
(but still caution) ofVBP. The greatest exception to this seems to be Premier, an organization 
representing hundreds of hospitals and health care groups nationwide, though their interest in 
VBP will be discussed later in the context of the resources created by the Premier demonstration 
project 
The providers, including both hospitals and professionals, share the same goals of quality 
improvement and improved efficiency as do the purchasers. Almost everyone agrees that overall 
health care (and Medicare) costs have been spiraling out of controL In order to address this, 
purchasers are in favor of plans that improve the quality provided through standardization of 
care, while also increasing savings in the long run, since better quality of care is also cheaper 
care. Improved quality of care would decreased expensive hospitalization times and decrease 
morbidity and mortality as well, which would all result in decreased calls. At least in theory, 
P4P would be able to accomplish these goals. 
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Hospital groups, however, have serious reservations about the design ofVBP. One of the 
most contentious issues is the proposed budget-neutral design. CMS believes that VBP requires 
no additional funding to fund incentives, instead drawing incentives from a pool of an at-risk 
percentage ofDRG payments. Dr. Valuck of CMS has cited evidence from economics literature 
stating that, in fact, hospitals should perform better if they believe they have "lost something that 
they need to earn back" as opposed to working toward incentives "that the individual or entity 
may have thought they weren't going to get anyway." Many provider groups have expressed 
fears that CMS, by advocating for budget neutrality, is trying to use VBP as a vehicle to cut costs 
rather than focusing primarily on quality improvement. Hospital and hospital group 
representatives argue instead that VBP will need an initial investment in order to drive the i 
improvements in quality and efficiency that CMS desires. Hospitals also argue that a budget- i 
neutral VBP program would punish lower-performing hospitals. Hospitals struggling to remain r 
fiscally solvent may find even a 1% reduction in DRG payments to be backbreaking. In 
addition, hospitals lacking the funds 
In addition, hospital groups fear that budget neutrality could potentially jeopardize 
helpful collaboration between hospitals. As Ms. Foster states, hospitals are worried whether 
increased competition would have a "chilling effect" on hospital collaboration, given that 
hospitals might be less likely to share secrets when they know they are competing for the same 
money. While Premier HQID has not shown such harmful competitive behavior, the amount of 
incentive (1% ofDRG payments at risk) has also been relatively small. Now that CMS has 
proposed a larger incentive for VBP (2-5% ofDRG payments at risk), hospitals may be even less 
inclined to collaborate on quality improvement efforts. 
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Hospital groups also fear that P4P has not shown the same sort of promise to improve 
quality that its proponents believe to exist. Indeed, this paper's mini-systematic review indicates 
that the evidence for P4P's effectiveness in respect to the Premier HQID program is mixed, and 
that the existing studies have design limitations. Certainly, hospital groups have been vocal 
about the relative lack of research that exists for P4P. The AHA cautioned that P4P is "a policy 
idea that is still largely untested and unproven. "30 The AAMC, quoting Desai et al., notes that 
"the empirical foundations of pay for performance in health care are rather weak" and that there 
remains "considerable need for progress on a research agenda for studying financial incentives in 
health care."43 The hospitals clearly do not want a wholesale change in payment system in all 
aspects of health care until CMS has research that indicates that P4P has obvious benefits in 
health care quality improvement. 
Similarly, most hospital groups also object to the untested nature ofVBP. Both large and 
small hospital groups have expressed concern over the untested nature of VBP all expressing 
their hope that the government will implement VBP slowly and carefully. As discussed in the 
results, the F AH and Billings join the AAMC and AHA in emphasizing that VBP is "in the very 
early phase"39 and must be carefully developed in order to "avoid unintended consequences."30 
These hospital groups clearly fear the implementation of a fairly unproven and untested payment 
system, given that the hospitals would likely bear the brunt of any problems experienced in a 
wide scale P4P adoption by Medicare. Not surprisingly, most hospital groups would prefer a 
slow adoption of a VBP program that will have plenty of field-testing and research performed 
and can adapt quickly to address administrative problems and rapidly evolving medical 
literature. 
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Even CMS 's VBP proposal admits that "there is little formal evaluation occurring of 
existing hospitals P4P programs" and that "most of the published studies have significant 
methodological limitations that hamper our ability to understand the impact of these programs 
and how various design features influence the observed results."6 For example, the VBP 
proposal notes that "five of the seven studies did not use control groups" which is "a critical 
issue in evaluating the impact of a P4P program." The VBP proposal notes that two studies with 
control groups "saw very modest improvements in performance" compared with improvements 
through public reporting, with "even less evidence of the effect ofP4P on patient outcomes." 
The VBP proposal also admits that the P4P programs studied "generally focused on a small set 
of process measures covering a handful of diagnoses" and therefore could not conclude whether 
''their findings generalize to other kids of measures, such as patient experience." With such 
caveats, the VBP proposal agrees with the AAMC and AHA that the evidence base for P4P is 
weak and requires additional research. 
Hospital groups express similar concern about the use of patient-centeredness and 
outcomes measures that they feel require more research, experience, and field-testing to 
understand the ramifications fully and decrease the risk of unintended consequences. While 
most hospital groups recognize the validity of patient-centeredness measures, the prevailing 
opinion seems to be that CMS must perform more research and field testing in order to 
understand better how improved patient satisfaction correlates with better quality of care. For 
example, as Ms. Foster states, patient-centeredness scores tend to improve with new 
construction. Should VBP then be a vehicle to reward new construction or other amenities such 
as valet parking? On the other hand, if patient satisfaction is a desirable endpoint to be measured 
and rewarded, should it matter how hospitals achieve increases? Nevertheless, HCAHPS is a 
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very new program and CMS has only recently released data that investigators must analyze 
carefully for trends and effectiveness. Hospitals argue that patient outcomes measures are even 
' 
more difficult to implement correctly given that outcomes maybe beyond the hospital's control. 
Therefore, outcomes measures have the greatest risk of unintended consequences, especially 
adverse patient selection, given that hospitals may be unwilling to admit complex and very ill 
patients that may harm their outcomes scores. 
I suspected that providers would disagree on the VBP 's proposed methods of developing 
and endorsing measures, given media coverage suggesting that measure selection would be a 
hotly debated topic.44 However, the data strongly suggest that the vast majority of providers 
support CMS's currently favored method of including measures adopted by the HQA and 
endorsed by the NQF. Given that most stakeholders approve of this method, CMS should 
continue this approach. 
The only hospital group with a strong endorsement ofVBP has been Premier. However, 
this may be strongly related to Premier's role in the Premier HQID program and a financially 
motivated desire to continue supplying health IT and consulting services for VBP. Critics have 
been concerned about whether Premier's involvement in the design and disbursement of health 
IT for HQID was a conflict of interest, given that Premier facilitates the acquisition of $17 
billion/year worth of medical supplies for over 25% of the nation's hospitals, and has been 
previously under investigation for anti-trust violations.45 However, these concerns did not 
prevent CMS from agreeing to involve Premier in data collection and analysis ofHQID, and it is 
unknown how much involvement Premier may have in future P4P initiatives. Certainly, further 
involvement in VBP would be a financial windfall for Premier. Given the apparent success of 
Premier HQID and the credit that Premier has claimed for their role in that program, CMS will 
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certainly consider Premier should VBP require standardized health IT and data collection. 
Nevertheless, even Premier expresses concern over the VBP proposal's assertion that no 
additional funding is necessary. Premier's president, Richard Nor ling, has stated previously that 
Premier "can't and won't be associated with a policy that ... is funded with reductions in 
payments."11 
The Providers: Professional Groups 
Like the hospital groups, the professional groups share similar goals with those ofthe 
payer groups with respect to increasing the quality and efficiency of health care while decreasing 
the ballooning costs associated with Medicare. Also like the hospital groups, professional 
groups are concerned with the readiness of the program for full-scale adoption in Medicare, in 
addition to the structure of incentives and payments. Professional groups have questions about 
how VBP will affect their autonomy. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the AMA's 
resistance to the Medicare P4P initiatives. 
Surprisingly, only the ACS, the ANA, the AONE, and the SHM represented the interests 
of professional groups at the Senate Finance Committee Roundtable, hardly representative of the 
diversity of physicians in this nation. Among the professional groups not present at the VBP 
Roundtable were the AMA, AAFP, ACP, and many others. While I am not aware of the 
selection process for stakeholders sitting at the VBP Roundtable, the Senate Finance Committee 
likely wished to focus more on hospital groups and inpatient providers such as hospitalists, as 
VBP would affect them much more directly than other physician groups, whose constituents 
might be highly outpatient-based and more interested in outpatient initiatives such as PGP and 
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PQRI. However, the fact that only two physician groups sat at the VBP Roundtable is very 
interesting, considering that two nursing groups were also present. 
Of the physician groups at the VBP Roundtable, only the SHM strongly supports VBP. 
SHM' s support may be rooted in the fact that their constituents, hospitalists, stand to gain 
influence with the Senate Finance Committee through their support ofVBP. Among the 
professional groups, ACS is tJ;!e most vocal opponent to VBP. The ACS believes that VBP is an 
untested, unproven program with poorly developed and ill-defined measures and an incentive 
structure that has not been well-studied. The ACS shares the concerns by hospital organizations 
like the AHA and AAMC that VBP is not ready for implementation. These professional groups 
are concerned about the untested nature ofP4P and would like a slow adoption ofVBP together 
with careful field testing and substantial research concerning the ability ofP4P to improve 
quality and efficiency of health care while also avoiding unintended consequences that may harm 
physician interests. Multiple professional groups also share the concern of hospital groups that 
with budget neutrality, VBP will primarily be a vehicle to cut costs up front rather than drive cost 
savings down the road through improvement in health care quality and efficiency. 
Many professionals also fear the loss of autonomy through participation in VBP and 
another other P4P programs. Although none of the professional groups mentioned the concept of 
professional autonomy at the VBP Roundtable, at least one media account reports that doctors 
are concerned that P4P programs will erode professional autonomy and lead to "cookbook 
medicine."46 A representative of the Heritage Foundation echoes these thoughts, calling the new 
VBP initiatives "pay for compliance, not pay for performance," and laments that "integrity and 
independence of the medical profession could be compromised." The threat to physician 
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autonomy may be what prompted the creation of the AMA' s strict set of principles concerning 
any future P4P initiatives.47 
The omission of the AMA from the VBP Roundtable is particularly notable given their 
previous vocal opposition to certain aspects ofP4P programs like VBP. Likely reasons for the 
AMA's omission become clearer when we examine the relationship between the AMA and the 
Senate Finance Committee. In February 2008, the Senate Finance Committee banned the AMA 
from talks involving a bill for Medicare Reform. The AMA "lost the trust" of Senator Baucus 
when it "broke a confidentiality agreement about Medicare talks last year and informed state 
affiliates."48 In addition, the Senate Finance Committee apparently did not appreciate that the 
AMA supported a budget provision in 2006 halting scheduled cuts in favor oflarger future cuts, 
then later criticizing this provision. Overall, the AMA has been one of the most vocal critics of 
P4P, for better or for worse. 
Despite the fact that the membership of the AMA, once the pre-eminent physician 
organization in the US, has now dwindled to around 24% of all US physicians, the AMA remains 
the largest physician group and therefore generates considerable attention with every move. In 
2005, the AMA issued a set of strict principles and guidelines for any future P4P initiatives.47 At 
a contentious meeting with a recurring theme of needing to ."stand for our principles,"49 the 
AMA indicated that it would oppose any plan that did not include the following principles50 : 
• ensuring quality of care. 
• fostering the physician/patient relationship. 
• "completely" voluntary physician participation. 
• accurate data and fair reporting. 
• fair and equitable program incentives. 
The AMA has claimed that without these principles, P4P programs could be a "lose/lose 
proposition for patients and their physicians" and merely benefit health insurers.51 One 
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physician from another specialty group remarked that the AMA's principles seem grounded in 
the idea that "pay-for-performance is now seen as something that physicians need to be protected 
against."52 
Not surprisingly, other physician interest groups have taken exception to these guidelines. 
They are concerned by the aU-or-nothing approach that the AMA seems to be taking with P4P, 
fearing that their hard-line stance could compromise physicians' bargaining position on Capitol 
Hill. The AMA, however, insists that its principles do allow for negotiations by starting "on 
principles."53 Nevertheless, several specialty groups including the American Academy of 
Family Physicians (AAFP), the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and the American 
College of Physicians (ACP) have indicated that they are willing to provide "support and 
assistance" in developing P4P programs. These specialty groups may be willing to support 
legislation in order to gain influence on the final design of any mandatory P4P programs, 
including VBP, and possibly extract other benefits in the process, such as added reimbursements. 
AMA's P4P "principles" underscore the fact that physicians are concerned about P4P and 
its potential consequences to physician autonomy. The primary question now remains: how 
much influence will physicians have over a comprehensive inpatient P4P program that will affect 
the vast majority of hospitals? There is some validity to the argument that the AMA's rigid 
guidelines will jeopardize physician involvement in determining performance measures and 
other aspects ofVBP. Clearly, the AMA wishes to establish ground rules while P4P is still 
relatively nascent in order to protect physician interests. The AMA reticence to embrace may 
reflect the fear that the long-term consequences ofP4P implementation are not well-studied. As 
mentioned above, few studies have been conducted about the impact on inpatient health care 
quality by P4P, and the results have been mixed. Therefore, the AMA's insistence on making 
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participation in any P4P program voluntary seems based on a desire to protect physicians from 
P4P programs that do not adequate represent physician interests. 
Complicating these issues is that the AMA is no longer the monolithic voice for 
physician interests. In fact, as evidenced by the contentious debates leading up to the 2005 and 
2007 P4P recommendations, the AMA is certainly does not present a united front. Other 
specialty groups, as well as many AMA constituents, fear that the AMA's principles are 
unrealistic and pushing them on Capitol Hill will leave physicians with no influence over the 
final design of mandatory P4P programs such as VBP. Some see acquiescence to the 
inevitability ofP4P and VBP as a method of ensuring that physicians still have some room at the 
bargaining table when Congress debates the details. However, while physicians generally lack 
the political clout that some better organized interest groups possess, one physician noted that 
physician resistance eventually defeated capitation, another managed care initiative. 52 In the 
end, the AMA may remain influential just by staying with its principles, as well as gaining 
political capital with its own members and other specialty groups. The opposite is also possible: 
should the AMA remain so inflexible that politicians turn to other groups for feedback for P4P 
programs like VBP, the AMA may be headed for irrelevance. 
The debate over AMA' s principles, therefore, highlights a potentially growing rift 
between the AMA and physician specialty groups who feel that the AMA does not represent 
their best interests. The AMA has been steadily losing members to these groups. The issue of 
P4P appears to have driven a wedge between the AMA and the other physician groups, both in 
the issues of AMA's principles and in the issue of AMA's protectiveness over its own 
performance measures. In fact, AMA's actions may have increasingly united physician specialty 
groups against them. The AMA no longer speaks for all physicians, and a divided voice may 
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serve to weaken physician bargaining power in Congress and increase the likelihood that the 
final VBP legislation will not adequately address physician interests. 
In light of the fact that most believe mandatory VBP participation for all hospitals 
accepting Medicare patients to be inevitable, the AMA might be better served focusing on other 
aspects ofP4P that would prove beneficial or harmful for physicians- that is, the other four 
principles. For example, the concept of a mandatory P4P program that is budget neutral seems to 
be especially repugnant among most physicians, as it would punish a large number of hospitals 
and prevent cooperation that might otherwise lead to desired improvement in health care quality. 
Physicians are also very worried about the validity of the performance measures to be used in 
VBP, so the AMA would be best served trying to work toward a consensus between all 
physicians (including those in other specialty groups) in terms of the best performance measures 
to use. 
Most importantly, the AMA should understand that it no longer represents the majority 
opinion ofU.S. physicians. Its stance on P4P principles and performance measures has harmed 
its relationship with the other specialty groups. The AMA should strive to work with, and 
compromise with, other specialty groups so that its message is not blunted by physician in-
fighting. If physicians are to have any significant political clout regarding P4P and other health 
care issues in Congress, the AMA must take the initiative to work with the other specialty groups 
in order to present a unified front. 
Other Stakeholders 
The Commonwealth Fund, the lone patient advocacy group invited to the VBP 
Roundtable, supports VBP. The Commonwealth Fund has stated that "quality of care does not 
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correspond to spending" and that "paying for high performance rewards achievement." This, 
however, is not necessarily representative of patients' views ofVBP and P4P. While this paper 
does not focus on patients' opinions on P4P, patients likely do not have a strong understanding 
or even awareness ofP4P. One survey conducted in 2005 found that patients are only "modestly 
supportive" of any plan paying physicians more for providing better quality of care. 54 
According to this poll, only 38% favor the plan for paying physicians more based on 
achievement. However, 67% favor the plan if it lowers their costs (premiums, deductibles, and 
co-pays). Patients are unlikely to become better-informed about the link between improved 
quality and decreased costs until the issue ofVBP enters the spotlight, which is unlikely as long 
as VBP and Medicare reform are not at the top of the national agenda. 
The NQF appears to have positioned itself strongly in VBP and any future CMS P4P 
initiatives and programs. Given that the NQF is a non-profit organization arising from the public 
agenda to improve the quality of health care in the United States through setting goals and 
priorities for performance improvement, including standards for measurement and reporting of 
quality performance measures, stakeholders trust the NQF to endorse measures independent of 
government pressure. In addition, the NQF is staffed by a wide variety of experts and accepts 
feedback from a broad spectrum of stakeholders across the nation. The NQF is responsible for 
collecting proposed quality measures developed by stakeholders such as the AMA, endorsing 
and revising selected measures, and sending these measures to the CMS. The NQF will likely 
endorse measures for all CMS P4P programs well into the foreseeable future. 
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THE FUTURE OF VBP 
VBP embodies the hope among all stakeholders in health care that P4P can improve 
quality and efficiency of health care while decreasing costs. The goals for VBP, however, differ 
between the payers and providers, both of which are looking to protect their own interests. VBP 
must represent a compromise between the payers' desire to lower costs and providers' desire to 
protect their own assets and autonomy. The government should implement VBP slowly to 
prevent unnecessary harm to hospitals while also ensuring that VBP is indeed buying Medicare 
an improvement in quality and efficiency of health care that everyone desires. In doing so, the 
government must also ensure that small, rural, and safety net hospitals are unharmed by 
providing them with special arrangements and support, if necessary. 
Clearly, investigators must continue to research the ability ofP4P programs to improve 
the quality and efficiency of care while decreasing costs, especially in the context ofVBP. As 
shown in the mini-systematic review, the quality of evidence supporting VBP's effectiveness in 
improving health care quality is mixed. Why more studies have not been performed regarding 
P4P, considering that VBP represents a monumental shift in the way Medicare will reimburse for 
inpatient care, is unclear. One possibility is that having hospitals agree to participate in P4P 
studies is difficult. Participation in a P4P study would require at the very least that an entire 
segment of the hospital to participate, which would be costly and risky as well. A hospital could 
face significant costs to implement required health IT. In addition, any change in health care 
delivery would be confusing and difficult for hospital staff. Now that the Premier HQID 
program has been gathering data for several years, and investigators should be able to measure 
changes in quality and efficiency more easily. 
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Interestingly enough, payers seem content to advocate for VBP despite lacking strong 
evidence that P4P indeed improves quality and efficiency of health care. CMS, working against 
a deadline of late 2007, may not have had enough time to gather sufficient data or wait for 
investigators to publish enough adequate studies for review. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
payers continue to push for VBP is strong evidence of how politically charged the issue ofVBP 
has become. Certainly, opponents among the provider groups and lawmakers will continue to 
cite evidence showing that P4P does not have a strong evidence base supporting its effectiveness, 
while the proponents will continue to cite Premier's data from the Premier HQID program as 
evidence that P4P can indeed improve the quality of health care. 
Budget neutrality will continue to be a hotly debated topic. Payers such as CMS continue 
to believe that VBP can be effective in a budget-neutral design, while hospital groups are 
understandably fearful of its effects on lower-performing hospitals and collaboration between 
hospitals. However, political realities may force the government to implement a budget-neutral 
design in VBP, given the reticence ofpolicymakers to increase taxes. One possible compromise 
will be to keep rewards small (1% or less ofDRG payments), given that Premier HQID's small 
incentives were already enough to induce change in hospital behavior. A 2-5% incentive as 
proposed by CMS might be too much even for hospitals to continue collaborative efforts and 
should be avoided at least until field-tested. 
While most stakeholders may agree on the process of endorsing and selecting measures 
for VBP, CMS must continue to monitor the effects of its measures on hospital behavior to 
eliminate unintended consequences such as adverse patient selection and data gaming. Even 
measures as simple as requiring antibiotics within four hours for patients with community-
acquired pneumonia may lead to overuse of antibiotics for unclear cases. CMS must monitor 
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performance closely and listen to feedback from providers, and also be willing to alter or retire 
measures that are not appropriate or helping to deliver an improvement in health care quality as 
expected. As mentioned previously, outcomes measures are at greatest risk for adverse patient 
selection. One method of curtailing this risk is to monitor changes in patient admissions before 
and after VBP implementation. CMS must also develop robust risk adjustment models to protect 
hospitals that normally admit complex and difficult patients from penalty. 
To date, the proposal has not been brought to a vote in Congress. Many believed that the 
Congress needed to have passed VBP into law by late 2007 in order for the program to begin in 
fiscal year 2009, the deadline set by the DRA.55 However, in late 2007, Congress postponed the 
debate over Medicare/SCRIP reform, likely in light oflooming presidential elections. As such, 
the immediate future ofVBP is uncertain. With the uncertain climate surrounding the 
presidential elections of 2008, VBP will likely not be a high priority for policymakers until2009 
at the earliest. 
Likely, policymakers will elect to roll out VBP slowly. Leaders in the hospital industry 
will continue to urge caution with VBP, believing that VBP should encourage an improvement in 
quality and long-term cost reductions, rather than a cut in Medicare spending. In addition, much 
debate and analysis remain. In the meantime, the future ofVBP and P4P in Medicare, while 
seemingly inevitable, continues to wait for policymakers to bring the issue of quality of health 
care and Medicare spending back to the forefront. 
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Appendix 1: Glossary 
Acronym/Term Defmition 
AAFP American Academy of Family Physicians 
AAMC The Association of American Medical Colleges 
AAP American Academy of Pediatrics 
ACP American College of Physicians 
ACS American College of Surgeons 
AHA American Hospital Association 
AMA American Medical Association 
AMI acnte myocardial infarction 
ANA American Nursing Association 
AONE American Organization of Nurse Executives 
BCBSA Blue Cross Blue Shield Association 
Benchmark A reference point or basis of comparison. 
CABG Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
CAP Community-acquired pneumonia 
Composite An aggregation of individual measures. 
measure 
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 
DRA Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
DRG Diagnosis-Related Group, related to Medicare reimbursement. 
EMR Electronic Medical Records 
FAH Fe 
FFS Fee-For-Service, or a method of reimbursement that pays providers based 
on each service rendered. 
HbAlc Hemoglobin Ale, or glycosylated hemoglobin, is a measure of chronic 
diabetes. 
HCAHPS A standardized survey instrument and data collection methodology for 
measuring patients' perspectives on hospital care. 
Hospital Compare A tool on the CMS website providing information on hospital performance 
of care on certain measures: www.hosnitalcomnare.hhs.gov 
HF Heart Failure 
HQA Hospital Quality Alliance 
HQID Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, associated with Premier. 
IOM Institute of Medicine 
IT Information technology 
IPPS Inpatient Prospective Payment System 
LDL-C a type of cholesterol 
MMA Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 
NQF National Quality Forum, a semi-public organization focused on improving 
quality that represents many interests in health care 
P4P Pay-for-performance; originally a business payment model that reimburses 
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Acronym/Term Det1nition 
based on results attained. 
P4R Pay-for-reporting, or reimbursement for reporting data. 
RHQDAPU Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update, or CMS's 
first nationwide pay-for-reporting program. 
Risk adjustment A method of reducing the effects of characteristics of patient population 
outside the control of providers on performance measures. 
SCIP Surgical Care Improvement Project 
SHM Society of Hospital Medicine 
VBP V aiue-Based Purchasing, or a CMS policy mechanism that links payment 
to performance with regards to Medicare 
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Appendix 2: P4P literature 
Study intervention group contemporary measures time summary of findings conclusion 
control period 
Cutler et a/. 165 pts in Mercy 1694 pts in LDL-C testing, LDL-C 2 years 7 5'" and 90'" percentiles for lab testing if these rates were 
Medical Group, with MMGwith control and goal attainment extended to entire P4P 
diabetes and elevated similar population, medical group 
LDL-C, treated under conditions would have received 
P4P program under routine substantial incentive 
care payments 
Doran eta/. 8105 family practices none indicators for asthma, CA, I year achievement 81-96% on all clinical high levels of achievement 
in England CHD, COPD, DM indicators suggest that targets were 
too easy to achieve 
Glickman eta/. 54 hospitals in Premier 446 hospitals use of ACC/ AHA class I 3 years no significant difference in quality of Participation in Premier 
HQID guideline recommended care or outcomes for acute MI neither improved or 
therapies, in-hospital worsened quality of care or 
mortality outcomes for acute MI. 
Grossbart et a/. 4 acute care hospitals 6 hospitals in AMI, HF, pneumonia 2 years Significant difference in composite Premier HQID effective in 
in Catholic Healthcare Catholic quality score ofP4P participants (9.3%) improving quality of health 
Partners, participating Healthcare compared with control (6.7%), due care especially in HF care. 
in Premier HQID Partners, mainly to HF measures (19.2% versus 
declining to 10.9%) 
participate in 
Premier HQID 
Lindenauer eta/. 207 hospitals 406 hospitals 10 individual, 4 composite 2 years P4P participants improve 2.6-4.1% Hospitals in intervention 
participating in with public over 2 years group attained modest 
Premier HQID reporting only improvements. 
Mandel et a/. 4 3 practices none flu shot %, controller med 3 years %receiving perfect care from 4% to P4P can help drive 
% for persistent asthma, 88%;% receiving flu vaccine from improvement in quality of 
written self-management 22% to 62% care, but system changes 
plan% required as well. 
Premier White 262 hospitals none measures associated with 1 year improvements ranging from 3.4% in no conclusion provided 
Paper: Year I participating in AMI, CABG, CAP, HF, AMI to 9.8% in CAP from beginning to 
Premier HQID hip/knee replacement end of year I 
Premier White 253 hospitals none measures associated with 1 year improvements ranging from 3.5% in no conclusion provided 
Paper: Year 2 participating in AMI, CABG, CAP, HF, AMI to 10.4% in HF from year I 
Premier HQID hip/knee replacement (mean) to year 2 (mean) 
Rosenthal eta/. California physicians Pacific cervical cancer screening, I year improvements for cervical cancer: little quality gain for 
group Northwest mammography, HbA!c 5.3% v. 1.7% (control); mammography, money, mainly rewards 
physicians testing 1.9% v .. 2% (control); HbA1 c, 2.1% v. providers with higher 
group 2.1 %; $3.4 million spent in bonuses baseline performance 
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Appendix 3: Stakeholder Questions 
The following is a list of questions used for all stakeholder interviews. 
First of all, would you say Medicare is a logical place to try to implement P4P? 
Who would you say are the main advocates and opponents for P4P? 
My next question is about physician buy-in. I got the impression that some are strong advocates 
while others have great concern. What are your impressions of physicians' views in general? 
Some people argue that P4P can control costs while improving quality. Do you think it has that 
potential? 
Other people are concerned that P4P programs will do more harm than good. For example, some 
believe it may have the effect of adverse selection on patients and lead to such things as gaming. 
What do you think about that? 
Are the benchmarks CMS has now good enough to let us measure whether P4P programs really 
can improve quality? 
Do you think electronic medical records or other health IT are required for P4P? 
Do you believe transparency is a good idea for P4P? 
Should patient perception of quality play a role in P4P programs? 
What about smaller and rural hospitals? Do P4P programs pose any challenges or advantages to 
them? 
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What about budget neutrality? Can P4P work with budget neutrality? 
How do you think budget neutrality could affect collaboration between hospitals? 
Recently, as you know, CMS has said that it will no longer reimburse for so-called "never" 
events [explain if necessary: foreign objects remaining in the body, amputation of the wrong 
limb, decubiti, death from medical error, etc.). Do you think this will make a significant 
difference to safety? Or will it produce less than people might expect? How do you think it will 
play out? 
Let me move to the specific questions about the Premier demonstration and the VBP proposal. 
What goals was the Premier demonstration meant to reach, and how did it do? 
Do you think we have enough evidence to adopt VBP? 
What do you see as the future ofVBP? Do you expect it to be national policy in the near future? 
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